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Abstract 
 
This study is motivated by the overall poor performance of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes in recipient countries in terms of 
economic growth consequences, and tries to explore the relevance of 
institutional determinants for economic growth in these programme 
countries. The analysis, at the same time, also takes into consideration the 
claim by New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature, which points out an 
overall positive consequence of institutional quality determinants on 
economic growth for countries in general.  
 
Taking a panel data of IMF member countries, the thesis primarily focuses 
on the IMF programme countries, during 1980-2009; a time period during 
which the number of IMF programmes witnessed an increasing trend. 
Firstly, important determinants of economic- and political institutional 
quality in IMF programme countries are estimated by applying the System-
GMM approach, so as to find significant determinants among them. Here, a 
parliamentary form of government, aggregate governance level, civil 
liberties, openness, and property rights all enhance overall institutional 
quality. Specifically, greater monetary- and investment freedom are 
conducive for political institutional quality, while military in power impacts 
negatively. Moreover, economic growth is conducive for enhancing 
economic institutional quality. Thereafter, the impact of the significant 
institutional determinants is then estimated on real economic growth, both 
directly, and also indirectly, through the channel of macroeconomic 
stability. Results mainly validate that institutional determinants overall play 
a positive role in reducing macroeconomic instability, and through it, and 
also independently, enhance real economic growth.  
 
In the last part of the thesis, Pakistan is selected as a representative example 
of a frequent user of IMF resources. Here, by applying the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model techniques, various counterfactual scenarios 
are estimated for a period of 1980-2014, to see impact of an institutional 
determinant, KOF index of globalization on macroeconomic instability and 
real economic growth. Results highlight that through enhanced focus on 
institutional quality determinants, macroeconomic instability can be 
reduced, and hence higher growth rate of GDP can be achieved. 
   
1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 The IMF and its changing role 
 
The 1930s saw the Great Depression, and the response of various countries 
like raising trade barriers and devaluing currencies (to boost exports) put 
cracks in the monetary cooperation internationally. To correct this trend and 
to ensure that oversight is kept for avoiding such happenings in the future, 
in 1945 at Bretton Woods (USA), International Monetary Fund (IMF; or 
simply the 'Fund') was formed. The Fund came into being through the 
Articles of Agreement
1
, which were signed in 1945, bringing IMF into 
formal existence.   
 
IMF oversaw that the member countries adhered to the par value system or 
the Bretton Woods system, whereby members pivoted their currencies to 
US dollar, and only made adjustment in their pegged rates for correcting 
fundamental balance of payments (BOP) disequilibrium (Bird, 2003). With 
the dissolution of the Bretton Woods system during 1968-1973
2
, the Fund's 
oversight role got limited in the presence of flexible exchange rate regime. 
Having said that IMF created an Oil Facility to deal with the issue of huge 
increase in oil prices in the early 1970s, whereby through the Facility 
surplus oil related revenues of oil exporting countries were re-routed to oil 
importing countries to deal with balance of payments crisis in the oil 
importing countries. Surplus oil revenues also meant commercial banks had 
a large pool of loanable funds for countries in BOP crisis, but with the 
rising of floating exchange rates by the end of 1970s, meant interest 
payments became a problem for these countries (which included developing 
countries). The Third World debt crisis saw an increase in IMF's role who 
lent to these countries, under IMF programme. Although borrowing related 
                                                          
 
1
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm  
2
 http://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm 
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conditionalities
3
 were first introduced in early 1950s by IMF to address 
fears of United States due to its underwriting of Fund's operations, the role 
of conditionality enhanced with IMF's greater coverage of lending 
operations, in terms of more member countries helped in resolving their 
BOP crisis. Hence, it could be seen that the oversight role of the IMF, had 
enhanced to correcting BOP related issues (through Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF) in 1986), and correcting BOP related issues and enhancing 
economic growth through Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF)
4
. Thus, the enhancement of scope meant that IMF's focus was now 
both macroeconomic issues and economic growth of recipient countries, 
apart from the primarily initial oversight role.    
 
1.2 IMF programmes and their consequence 
 
The Third World debt crisis caused many developing countries in problem 
to turn away from private banks to IMF lending, which meant greater role 
for the IMF, and in turn greater scrutiny of IMF programmes.  In fact, with 
the fall of Communism in early 1990s and the move of those countries 
towards market economy system, led to further increase in IMF's clientele, 
and for these countries a 'Systematic Transformation Facility' was created 
by the Fund (Killick, 1995). According to Bird (2003) the design of the 
IMF programme came under criticism for tilting heavily on the side of the 
Monetarist way of thinking, since more focus was placed on the demand 
side of the economy, and less on the supply side, and in that sense the 
programme was too rigid to accommodate the specific needs of a particular 
country; and New structuralists found the programme conditionalities to 
have stagflationary consequences for recipient countries. In fact the opening 
up of ESAF window (and previously of SAF facility), which was later 
renamed in 1999 to Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility due to 
expansion of Fund's role to poverty reduction, was a response by IMF to 
focus more on supply side- and microeconomic measures (Bird, 1996).  
 
                                                          
 
3
 According to Barro and Lee (2005, p. 1248), the process whereby quarterly installments 
are released to programme countries when they meet a pre-decided set of performance 
benchmarks, is referred to as the process of conditionality. 
4
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp 
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Yet, the response of IMF to deal with the supply-side related criticism has 
remained below satisfaction. Although according to Schadler et al. (1993) 
internal observations of IMF considered this response to be positive, 
academics/researchers like Killick (1995) criticized IMF's underlying basis 
for reaching such a conclusion. In fact, an independent evaluation of ESAF 
by IMF was more critical than the earlier positive internal evaluations, but 
according to Botchwey et al. (1998) IMF only reluctantly and partially 
accepted the findings of the independent evaluators.  The consequence of 
all this has been that overall during the last three decades or so, Fund 
programmes have not allowed recipient countries to achieve sustained 
macroeconomic stability (Evrensel, 2002; Easterly, 2005), and have at most 
been neutral for economic growth (Haque and Khan, 1998; Bird, 2001; 
Barro and Lee, 2005; Bird, 2007; Arpac et al., 2008).  
 
1.3 New Institutional Economics and IMF programmes 
 
Williamson (1975) coined the term of 'New Institutional Economics' (NIE)
5
 
(Chavance, 2009, p. 45). His approach was critical of neo-classical 
Economics, since it did not consider the importance of institutions, the 
underlying role of transaction cost
6
 and firm (Chavance, 2009, p. 45; 
Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 65). NIE agrees with neo-classical Economics 
that economic agents look to maximize their utility (or profit), but unlike 
the neo-classical and monetarist schools of thought, they find the rationality 
of economic agents to be bounded in the wake of opportunistic behaviour 
and asymmetric information.  
 
In such an environment, there will be costs associated firstly with reaching 
a price mechanism that truly reflects the buyers and sellers potential in 
markets and, secondly costs will be involved in successfully negotiating 
contracts among individual economic agents or groups (Chavance, 2009, p. 
45). Coase (1937, p. 388) pointed out that in case of high transaction costs, 
it may be more suitable for an economic agent to move away from the 
                                                          
 
5
 NIE is in contrast to the Original Institutional Economics school, which is mainly based 
on the works by such institutional economists as Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and John 
R. Rommons (1862-1945) (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 64, 65 and 87).  
6
 Transaction costs included costs related with gathering and inspecting information, 
along with pertaining to enforcement, among others (Dahlman, 1979, p.148).  
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governance structure of a market to a governance structure of a firm, if the 
later helps the agent in economizing such costs better than the market. 
Institutions help evolve these governance structures that help coordinate 
markets and firms so that transaction costs could be optimally reduced 
(Chavance, 2009) and in doing so (unlike neo-classical school of thought) 
give greater role to government, both for regulation and for directly 
involving themselves in markets and/or firms if need be, depending on a 
particular economy and given sector(s) within it. These specifications of 
NIE, therefore, also highlight the importance for reform policy formulation, 
which should not be one-size-fits-all, but should be 'context specific' 
depending on the particular nature, composition and requirement of an 
economy.  
 
Institutions are therefore, seen as vital in dealing with opportunistic 
behaviour and information related costs (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 13-
24 and 36-38). While Williamson see institutions only in the nature of 
formal rules that formulate governance structures (in public and private 
realms and both for markets and firms, and their hybrid
7
), another important 
proponent of NIE, Douglass North considers them as composed of formal 
(written rules) and informal constraints (unwritten and communicated by 
society as social norms, behaviour, and culture) (Chavance, 2009, p.79; 
North, 1990, p. 4, 37 and 47). Hence, institutions in the shape of laws and 
conventions, see greater role of government in realizing an environment 
where contracts are abided by, and property rights
8
 are distributed and 
guarded adequately against any possible opportunistic behaviour. NIE 
points out that through institutions, different governance structures (within 
government and private sectors) are evolved that help reduce transaction 
costs. Through such governance structures, pricing mechanism in markets 
and firms are improved, costs are adequately reduced for negotiating and 
implementing contracts, and incentives and checks are put in place to help 
reduce inefficiencies in distribution and enforcement of property rights 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 118-20). All this is expected to reduce 
                                                          
 
7
 A hybrid is such a governance structure that is characterized by features of both the firm 
and market (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 125). 
8
 Eggertsson (1996; p.7) points out that institutional economics defines property rights as 
an actor's right to use assets that are valuable (Alchian, 1965). 
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transaction costs, which in turn feed into lowering overall production costs, 
incentivizing greater investment, and positively affecting economic growth.   
Bird (2003, p. 5) indicated that IMF programmes were strongly influenced 
by the Monetarist thought process, whereby showing greater tilt towards the 
demand side of the economy rather that the supply side. Looking more 
deeply into the basic formulation of IMF programmes, Killick (1995, p. 
129) indicates that the analytical framework of these programmes is based 
on the Polak Model (Polak, 1957). As per this model, imbalance in balance 
of payments results from excessive creation of domestic credit over money 
(supply or) demand (usually resulting as a consequence of excessive 
financing of budget deficit). Bird (2003, p.5) pointed out that traditional 
macroeconomic thinking-based conditionality in IMF programmes 
overlooked the important role of government as a 'crowding-in' factor 
(especially in the case of developing countries), and according to empirical 
evidence, programme assumptions produced little impact on 
macroeconomic variables in IMF programmes, on one hand, and as per 
New Structuralists resulted in stagflationary consequences for programme 
countries.   
 
Both neo-classical and Monetarist schools of thought see virtually 
automatic clearing of markets, since they see a world where economic 
agents show no opportunistic behaviour, are rational and that the 
information they need to reach utility (or profit) maximizing (or cost 
minimizing) decisions entail no costs (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.14-15). 
Hence, one sees limited role of government and institutions in the world of 
this traditional economic thinking. Since, IMF programmes borrow heavily 
from them, therefore, the conditionalities primarily focus on monetary 
aggregates targeting on the demand side of the economy, and have not 
concerned themselves much with institutions on the supply side of the 
economy. Empirical evidence, in particular, during the last three decade or 
so, indicates that institutions matter for economic growth (Groenewegen et 
al., 2010, p. 36-38; Rodrik et al., 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005; Afonso and Jalles, 2011). Although IMF has also 
internalized this role of institutions to some extent and has tried to evolve 
their programmes to improve the focus on the supply side of the economy, 
but once again their over-indulgence in the traditional economic thinking, 
has not allowed them to move away to a reform agenda that understands the 
6 
 
importance of improving institutional quality determinants in programme 
countries.  
 
1.4 Motivation 
 
NIE literature indicates institutions matter for economic growth. Empirical 
evidence of the last three decades or so indicates that countries which have 
focused reform agenda on improving institutional quality, have witnessed 
an overall positive impact of this on economic growth. This background 
motivates an analysis into understanding the role determinants of 
institutional quality play on economic growth in IMF programme countries. 
A positive consequence in this regard should underline the importance of 
institutions to IMF, so that their future programmes base themselves more 
on the NIE framework, something which it is hoped will help reverse the 
previously poor record of IMF programmes in terms of economic growth 
consequences. It may be indicated here that the in the thesis, both formal 
and informal aspects of institutions will be taken into account. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Determinants of institutional quality: a case study of IMF 
programme countries 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction
9
 
 
The effectiveness of the conditionalities
10
 of IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) programmes (mostly restricted to addressing macroeconomic 
stability concerns) on recipient countries has come under severe criticism, 
especially in terms of their consequence for economic growth (IEO, 2007; 
Bird and Willett, 2004), something that the IMF has also realized along the 
way (IMF, 2005a; IEO, 2007).   
 
Notwithstanding the level of implementation of IMF programmes by 
recipient countries (an area that is still under-researched), research has 
shown mostly a neutral or negative program impact on economic growth; 
and to look beyond the neo-classical Economics underlying basis of these 
programmes (Kuncic, 2014). Such behavioural assumptions consider a 
zero-transaction cost
11
 world, and therefore do not see much role of 
institutions, which according to NIE (New Institutional Economics) are 
instrumental in reducing the costs involved, incentivize private property
12
 
                                                          
 
9
 There are two earlier versions of this paper can be found at 'Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive'(http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/). The first version was placed there on 11th 
November, 2013 (https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/secure/cgi/users/home?screen=EPrint%3A%3AView&eprintid=51344), 
while the second version on 3rd June, 2014  
(https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/secure/cgi/users/home?screen=EPrint%3A%3AView&eprintid=51409). 
10
 According to Barro and Lee (2005, p. 1248), the process whereby quarterly 
installments are released to programme countries when they meet a pre-decided set of 
performance benchmarks, is referred to as the process of conditionality. 
11
 Transaction costs included costs related with gathering and inspecting information, 
along with pertaining to enforcement, among others (Dahlman, 1979, p.148). Asymmetric 
information and heterogeneous nature of individual perceptions about how the world 
works, means transactions have associated costs; which are reduced by institutions 
(Harriss et al., 1995; North,1994, p. 17). 
12
 Eggertsson (1996; p.7) points out that institutional economics defines property rights as 
an actor's right to use assets that are valuable (Alchian, 1965). 
10 
 
protection, innovation and investment, and in turn help boost economic 
growth.  
 
Given this background, Kuncic (2014), for example, advocated the adoption 
of NIE framework for analyzing the dynamics and consequences of social 
(and other) interactions among economic agents. Moreover, most empirical 
research conducted from 1995 to 2004 pointed towards the presence of 
significant relation between institutional quality and economic performance 
(Ugur, 2010). 
 
The current study aims to find out significant institutional quality 
determinants, in the light of NIE framework, in programme countries of 
IMF (countries that have been under an IMF programme at one time or the 
other), with the aim to influence IMF in enhancing the scope of its future 
programmes by considerably increasing focus on institutional determinants; 
which is likely to result in an improved impact of such programmes on 
economic growth of programme countries.  
 
Furthermore, the study also intends to focus on prolonged users
13
 (member 
countries that have been under the IMF programmes for longer periods of 
time) as a sub-group, whose numbers have increased over the years since 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system (Barro and Lee, 2005; IEO, 
2002). Here also, the intention is to reach at determinants of institutional 
quality that are significant. Focus on the prolonged users is all the more 
necessary, since there is a rising concern (in terms of moral hazard issue) 
that such countries have under-performed in terms of carrying out hard 
economic reforms at the back of relatively easily available IMF resources 
(Evrensel, 2002).  
 
Hence, all IMF member countries (188 to be precise
14
) have been taken, 
along with the two sub-groups, namely programme countries, and 
prolonged users. Time period under review is from 1980 (when the role and 
penetration of IMF programmes increased) to 2009. 
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 According to IEO (2002, p. 9 and p. 24) countries fall under the prolonged user 
category if they remain under an IMF programme for at least seven years in a decade. 
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 Complete list at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm 
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The structure of the study is as follows: Section 2.2 reviews important 
related literature on the topic under discussion, data and  methodology are 
discussed in Section 2.3, while estimation and results are focused upon in 
Section 2.4. The last section (which is Section 2.5) concludes the study. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Literature sees IMF's financial programming techniques to be of the nature 
of over-simplistic/ one-size-fits-all, asking in turn to revisit the underlying 
basis of programmes (Buira, 1983; Bird, 2001; Bird, 2007). Such an 
inflexible nature is therefore unsuitable for the varied nature of programme 
countries (Stiglitz 2001; Vreeland, 2006; Abbot et al., 2010), which proves 
to be too conventional and rigid specifically for the developing countries, 
and remains a reason for neutral impact on economic growth (Abbot et al., 
2010).  
 
In the same vein, Nsouli et al. (2004) found absence of focus on 
institutional enhancing factors in evaluating programme success rate; 
furthermore indicated better institutional quality and conducive political 
environment had positive consequences for macroeconomic outcomes, and 
programme implementation rates. Similarly, Arpac et al. (2008) conducted 
a study covering 95 countries and a time period of 1992-2004 to point out 
that programme implementation record was better where countries had 
more trade openness (in turn, a significant institutional determinant). Also, 
the study suggested to IMF to focus on domestic politics also while forming 
expectations about the extent of programme implementation in a country. 
 
Importance of institutions has been underlined for a long time. Adam Smith 
(1976, p. 910)
15
 showed interest in institutions when he highlighted that a 
good judicial system (in other words, rule of law, which is an important 
institutional factor) was a pre-requisite for economic activity. Furthermore, 
he pointed out that the underlying differences between countries and 
regions were explained by institutional factors (Smith, 1976, p. 405).  
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 Adam Smith's book, 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations' 
was originally published in 1776. 
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Sadly, Neo-Classical Economics forgot this initial understanding by 
ignoring institutions. Rather it assumed a free-market, perfect competition 
basis for Pareto optimality or efficiency
16
 and took a production function 
that included labour and capital (Ugur, 2010). Such a technical production 
function is incompatible with regard to the existence of property rights and 
efficient contract enforcement (Rodrik, 2000), and does not explain the 
difference between developing and developed world (Ugur, 2010).  
 
Attention on the significance of institutions was later on re-emphasized in 
the decade of 1980s
17
, and especially during the 1990s from lessons 
obtained from the liberalization reform. Hence, it was realized that 
institutions were required for incentive system of price signal to work for 
increasing national welfare (Rodrik, 2000), and that they channelized 
investment away from rent-seeking behaviour to one that promoted 
creativity, and greater production (Shirley, 2008) . It was also pointed out 
that small changes at the margins helped improve economic growth 
(Rodrik, 2005). At the same time it was highlighted that while traditionally 
institutional change has been seen to happen gradually,  it was nevertheless 
not the only way for such a change to take place, but rather also at a 
revolutionary pace as for example was demonstrated by East Asian 
economies (Quibria, 2002). 
 
Shirley (2008) highlighted that NIE literature identified four sources for 
institutions being underdeveloped. Firstly, a legacy of poor institutions 
from colonizers, and which in turn needed to be set right as one of the 
complementing ways to enhance macroeconomic stability (North, 1990; La 
Porta et al., 1997; Acemoglu et al., 2001a, Acemoglu et al., 2003). 
Secondly, on the contrary where the country had endowments, colonizers 
did develop institutions to extract from local resources. Moreover, there 
also existed a positive relation between institutional development and the 
extent of settlement of colonizer (which in turn relied on the level of 
livability of colonizers locally); that is, the higher the extent of such a 
settlement, the greater the level of institutional development, as could be 
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 In such a situation, welfare of one person can only be increased by decreasing someone 
else's welfare (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.16). 
17
 By Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Scully (1988) (Ugur, 2010, p. 9). 
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seen in the case of Australia or Canada for that matter, among others 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001a and b; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
 
Thirdly, lack of political competition outside and inside of the country 
resulted in little motivation for leaders to build institutions for peoples' 
benefit at large, where such leaders faced virtually no strong opposition for 
building institutions that served their own vested interests (Nugent and 
Robinson, 2002). Fourthly, (at times) certain beliefs and norms discouraged 
development of markets and institutions (North, 1994 and 2004; Knack and 
Keefer, 1997).  Moreover, North (1990, p. 110) indicated that the 
institutional incentive system of the developing countries did not induce 
productive activity, and that is the underlying reason for the level of poverty 
there (being on the higher side).  
 
Many studies have pointed out the important role played by improvement in 
institutional quality in enhancing economic growth (for example, Rodrik et 
al., 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999). Specifically, Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005, p. 953) pointed out that income per capita was substantially higher in 
those countries, as compared to others, where institutions protected 
property rights more (a similar result highlighted by Afonso and Jalles 
(2011)).  
 
Political- and economic institutions are the two main types of institutions 
(IMF, 2005b; Joskow, 2008; Kuncic, 2014), where the former mainly 
encompass political environment/agents (for example, rules of elections, 
voters, extent and nature of power of government, etc.), while the later 
constitute the environment that enable functioning of markets (for instance, 
property rights). Moreover, 'inclusive economic institutions' work towards 
enhancing participation of people in economic activity through provision of 
better protection of property rights and other institutional determinants of a 
facilitating environment, as against 'extractive economic institutions', which 
transferred resources from the many to the group(s) that forms this 
collusion (to benefit it, in turn); furthermore, an inclusive/extractive 
economic institution resulted because of an inclusive/extractive political 
institutional setup (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 74-82; Acemoglu, 
2006; Acemoglu, 2008).   
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2.3. Data and Methodology 
 
2.3.1.  Theoretical design 
 
The present study is based on NIE's methodological framework, in which 
institutions are an outcome of rules and regulations that human beings 
establish, to act as constraints for governing the way humans deal with each 
other (North, 1990, p. 3). According to Williamson (1975) interaction takes 
place in either markets, firms, or their hybrid
18
, while the choice of a 
particular governance structure, in this regard, depends where the 
transaction costs are getting minimized the most (Chavance, 2009, p. 45 
and 46; Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 123-25). Institutions encompass both 
formal and informal constraints that shape the way humans interact (North, 
1990, p. 4), where the former are composed of written rules (pertaining to 
politics, economy, and contracts, among others; North, 1990, p. 47), while 
the later depict the unwritten (and communicated by society) social norms, 
behaviour, and culture (North, 1990, p. 4 & p. 37). While Williamson 
(1975) only considers formal rules, North (1990) considers both formal and 
informal constraints. In this study, both formal and informal aspects of 
institutions will be taken into account. 
 
According to North (1990, p. 4 & 5) while institutions are the rules, which 
govern the game, the agents who play the game are called organizations. 
These evolve as a consequence of a particular institutional framework, and 
in turn, influence that institutional framework; hence, both institutions and 
organizations  interact to bring institutional change. Also, North (1994, p. 
5) points out that institutional change is a result of choices that are in turn 
influenced by the changes that happen externally (outside a particular 
society or system), and the learning that takes place internally (within a 
society or system).  
 
While costs involved in personal exchange are reduced by traders through 
relying on private means (Williamson, 1985), and through trust and 
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 A hybrid is such a governance structure that is characterized by features of both the 
firm and market (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p. 125). 
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cooperation (Knack and Keefer, 1997), impersonal exchange required in 
addition, enforcement mechanisms implemented by state (Milgrom et al., 
1990). Similarly, Coase (1992, p. 197) emphasized the importance of 
lowering transaction costs for fostering exchange in the economy. Positive 
institutional change, therefore, means improvement in institutional quality, 
eventually leading to economic growth. 
 
According to NIE literature, institutions are both political and economic, 
where one influences the other to bring overall change in institutional 
quality (Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Therefore, the current study analyzes institutional quality 
in terms of economic- and political institutional quality (in line with for 
example IMF, 2005b), in an effort to find out significant  
political/governance-, and economic institutional determinants for 
enhancing overall institutional quality in IMF programme countries. In the 
wake of NIE literature that supports the flow of positive causation from 
improvement in institutional quality to economic growth (Ugur, 2010), and 
in the light of criticism of previous IMF programmes in terms of their lack 
of consequence for economic growth (IEO, 2007; Bird and Willett, 2004), 
such a conclusion is supposed to help IMF make necessary adjustments in 
its FPP to enhance focus on determinants of institutional quality.  
 
2.3.2.  Sample 
 
While overall IMF member countries stand at 188
19
, the sample is 
composed of 129 'programme countries', which are those that have adopted 
at least one IMF programme during 1980-2009
20
. The reason behind taking 
this sample in the first place, is based on the premise that one of the main 
reasons why IMF programmes have under-performed in terms of their 
impact for economic growth, is due to their insufficient focus on improving 
institutional quality (an area, which has been shown in NIE literature to 
have positive consequences for economic growth).  
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 Complete list of IMF member countries is at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm 
20
 Information on whether a country has been under IMF program or not has been taken 
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Table 2.1. Prolonged users 
  
Years under IMF programme 
 
Prolonged user (yes/no) 
Sr.# Country Name 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 Total  Continent 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2009 
1990-
2009 
1 Mali 4 9 10 23 Africa 0 1 1 1 
2 Senegal 6 8 9 23 Africa 0 1 1 1 
3 Mexico 6 5 10 21 N. America 0 0 1 0 
4 Mozambique 3 9 9 21 Africa 0 1 1 1 
5 Niger 6 5 10 21 Africa 0 0 1 0 
6 Madagascar  6 5 9 20 Africa 0 0 1 0 
7 Malawi 4 8 7 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
8 Mauritania 5 8 6 19 Africa 0 1 0 0 
9 Tanzania 3 7 9 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
10 Uganda 3 9 7 19 Africa 0 1 1 1 
11 Benin  1 7 10 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
12 Burkina Faso 0 8 10 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
13 Cameroon 2 7 9 18 Africa 0 1 1 1 
14 Albania 0 7 10 17 Europe 0 1 1 1 
15 Argentina 5 8 4 17 S. America 0 1 0 0 
16 Bolivia 3 9 5 17 S. America 0 1 0 0 
17 Kyrgyz Republic 0 7 10 17 Asia 0 1 1 1 
18 Guyana 0 10 6 16 S. America 0 1 0 0 
19 Sierra Leone 1 6 9 16 Africa 0 0 1 0 
20 Armenia 0 6 9 15 Europe 0 0 1 0 
21 Chad 3 7 5 15 Africa 0 1 0 0 
22 Pakistan 1 7 7 15 Asia 0 1 1 1 
23 Rwanda 0 5 10 15 Africa 0 0 1 0 
24 Georgia 0 6 8 14 Europe 0 0 1 0 
25 Guinea 3 7 4 14 Africa 0 1 0 0 
26 Philippines 6 7 1 14 Asia 0 1 0 0 
27 Zambia 2 3 9 14 Africa 0 0 1 0 
28 Bulgaria 0 8 5 13 Europe 0 1 0 0 
29 Burundi 3 2 8 13 Africa 0 0 1 0 
30 Dominican Republic 2 4 7 13 N. America 0 0 1 0 
31 Ghana 0 5 8 13 Africa 0 0 1 0 
32 Jordan 2 8 3 13 Asia 0 1 0 0 
33 Turkey 1 3 9 13 Asia 0 0 1 0 
34 Dominica 5 0 7 12 N. America 0 0 1 0 
35 Honduras 0 7 5 12 N. America 0 1 0 0 
36 Nicaragua 0 4 8 12 N. America 0 0 1 0 
37 Tajikistan 0 4 8 12 Asia 0 0 1 0 
38 Lao 1 7 3 11 Asia 0 1 0 0 
39 Macedonia 0 7 4 11 Europe 0 1 0 0 
40 Panama 4 7 0 11 N. America 0 1 0 0 
41 Mongolia 0 7 3 10 Asia 0 1 0 0 
42 Serbia 0 1 8 9 Europe 0 0 1 0 
43 Algeria 1 7 0 8 Africa 0 1 0 0 
44 Russian Fed. 0 7 0 7 Asia 0 1 0 0 
Total           0 28 28 12 
Note: A prolonged user is represented by 1, and 0 otherwise; indicated under prolonged user heading above.  
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Moreover, as an extension, the sample of prolonged users has also been 
taken to analyze, in particular, significant institutional determinants in these 
countries (for the same time period). Hence, during 1980-2009, around one-
third of them (44 to be precise) were prolonged users (listed in Table 2.1 in 
descending order of number of years under IMF programme). Hence, Mali 
and Senegal have been the most prolonged users, having each been under 
an IMF programme for a total of 23 years overall in the sample period. 
Geographical mapping indicates that almost half of the prolonged users 
belonged to the continent of Africa, followed by Asia (at around one-fifth 
of the total prolonged users); places that have otherwise also seen 
prevalence of absolute poverty on the higher side. This, in turn, opens up 
possible area for future research, to understand the consequences of IMF 
resources for poverty and the economy overall for prolonged users of these 
two continents.  
 
Further analysis of Table 2.1 indicates that during the decade of 1980s there 
were surprisingly no prolonged users. At the same time, the next two 
decades of 1990s and 2000s, respectively, saw a mushrooming of prolonged 
users (28 countries to be precise, falling under this category, in each 
decade). Moreover, it could be seen that 12 countries remained prolonged 
users in both the 1990s and 2000s; pointing towards a possible prolonged 
user syndrome through the likely existence of moral hazard, whereby 
countries may have relied more on IMF resources than going for hard 
economic reforms. 
 
2.3.3. Data and variable description 
 
Economic institutional quality. Following IMF (2005b), this will be 
measured using the proxy of Economic Freedom Index (EFI) of the Cato 
Institute
21
, which captures five aspects of government size, the makeup of 
the legal framework and the extent of protection of property rights, along 
with access to sound money,  the level of liberty to trade internationally, 
and business, labour, and credit rules and regulations. Data is taken from 
1980-2009 (5-yearly up till 2000, and yearly after that). Ahmadov et al. 
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(2013) also employed EFI by Gwartney and Lawson (2003). The reason for 
employing this economic institutional proxy is the larger diversity of 
aspects that it includes, than some of the other proxy variables that have 
been used in previous studies like Investment Profile (International Country 
Risk Guide; ICRG), and Freedom of the Press: Economic Environment 
(Freedom House).  
  
Political institutional quality. This will be measured using the proxy of 
Polity II (from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall et al., 2011), which 
captures 'political structures and regime change'
22
, and has been taken (like 
for example by Afonso and Jalles, 2011) to indicate, which variables 
significantly determine political institutional quality
23
. Data is taken for the 
time period 1980-2009.  This has been preferred due to the larger extent of 
its coverage of political environment, than some of the other political 
institutional proxy variables that have been used in earlier research like 
Democratic Accountability (International Country Risk Guide), Corruption 
Perception Index (Transparency International), and Political Terror Scale 
(Political Terror Scale). 
 
Political/governance variables. A host of variables are taken from the 
Database of Political Institutions
24
, to overall see the impact of electoral 
rules and political system. Variables analysed here include, i) regime (is a 
dummy variable indicating 0 for presidential, and 1 for parliamentary form 
of government; also taken in the study by Afonso and Jalles, 2011), ii) 
military (chief executive a military officer or not; existence of it is 
represented by 1, 0 otherwise), iii) Herfindahl Index Government (to 
basically reflect the strength/proportion of government seats in parliament), 
and iv) Herfindahl Index Opposition (indicates the extent of representation 
of opposition in parliament).  
 
An aggregate governance indicator has also been included in the study as a 
regressor. This has been calculated as a simple average of the five 
                                                          
 
22
 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9263?q=Polity 
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 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
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indicators. These five variables are from Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI; World Bank)
25
, which, in turn, have been produced by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2010)
26
. These five indicators cover aspects 
with regard to the level of voice and accountability (found significant in 
IMF, 2005b, for improving institutions), effectiveness of government, the 
situation of rule of law, the quality of regulations, and the extent of control 
of corruption.  
 
Data on civil liberties is taken from Freedom in the World (publication of 
Freedom House)
27
. Here, the least rating of degree of freedom is indicated 
by 1, while the highest rating is represented by 7.  
 
Economic variables. The first regressor here is openness, and a broad 
proxy that has been used here is KOF Index of Globalization
28
. Data is 
taken for the available time period of 1980-2009. Openness is indicated in 
literature to be positively related with enhancing institutional quality 
(Rodrik et al., 2002; IMF, 2005b). Although Alonso and Garcimartin 
(2013) did not find the impact of openness to be significant, KOF Index of 
Globalization, with its multidimensional approach, has been included for 
checking possible significance.  
 
Measures of economic freedom and prosperity are taken from the Index of 
Economic Freedom
29
 to see their influence on institutional quality. Sub-
indices taken here are, monetary-, fiscal-, and investment freedom, along 
with property rights. Unfortunately, data is only available since 1995; data 
is taken up till 2009. 
 
Lastly, log real GDP (at constant 2005 US$; and taken from World 
Development Indicators (WDI)
30
) has been included in the study, as one of 
the regressors to see its impact on both economic- and political institutional 
quality.  
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Endogeneity. NIE literature highlights the presence of the endogeneity 
issue in the case of institutions (for example Acemoglu et al., 2001a). In the 
current study, variables that are expected to be affected by this issue include 
property rights, aggregate governance indicator, fiscal freedom, monetary 
freedom, and real GDP for overall institutional quality. At the same time, 
variables expected to have endogeneity issue with respect to economic 
institutional quality include investment freedom and KOF index of 
globalization; while civil liberties in the case of political institutional 
quality. Moreover, as lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error 
term, therefore, lagged EFI and lagged Polity II may cause endogeneity 
problem in the regression. 
   
2.3.4. Econometric methodology
31
 
 
Institutional  quality will be determined using the following basic model: 
 
    = f (                               [1]          
 
where, institutional quality is indicated by     , lag of the dependent 
variable indicated by         , and variables with regard to 
political/governance aspects by the vector of    . Moreover, economic 
variables are indicated by the vector of    ; error term by    . 
 
While Eq[1] gives the overall framework, the next two equations with 
regard to economic- and political institutional quality, respectively, are:  
 
     =                                         [2] 
          
     =                                
         [3]          
 
where in the two equations above, country-fixed effects are indicated by  
 
 
and  
 
, and time specific effects by  
 
 and  
 
; while the error-terms by 
 
  
 and  
  
. 
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Moreover, Eq[2] and Eq[3] have been transformed by taking the first 
differences, as indicated below: 
 
                                   +       [4] 
 
                                   +       [5] 
 
where   stands for change between years t and t-1 for a variable. At the 
same time, one set of year indicators each is represented by    and   , 
respectively. Furthermore,     and     respectively, are the error terms. It 
may be noted here that through these transformed models, the possibility of 
heterogeneity (which is not fully captured by the regressors) is successfully 
dealt with by the effective elimination of country-fixed effects. 
 
The transformed models above (that is Eq[4] and Eq[5]) have been 
estimated in the current study by Arellano and Bover (1995) approach. This 
approach has the advantage that it allows information in the equations to be 
simultaneously incorporated in both levels and difference forms.  
 
At the same time, it is important to point out that inclusion of the lag 
dependent variable gives way to a statistical problem; by virtue of the lag 
dependent variable and the error term being automatically correlated with 
each other. Hence, the way out of this calls for including further lags of the 
dependent variable, which in turn act as instruments. Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) recommended for such model the 
GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) approach.
32
 Under this, the model 
gets estimated through GMM in both levels and differences simultaneously; 
in turn further enhancing the efficiency of the model through the addition of 
even more instruments to the system.  Furthermore, the current study 
employs standard errors that are completely robust towards serial 
correlation and arbitrary heteroskedasticity in GMM estimation. The above 
system has been estimated through the Stata software
33
; using the Stata 
command called 'xtabond2', which was developed by Roodman (2009). 
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2.4. Estimation and Results 
 
Determinants of institutional quality have been estimated for both the 
economic institutional quality, and the political institutional quality. As 
indicated earlier, Economic Freedom Index and Polity II index have been 
used as proxies for these two, respectively. Also, while the main thrust of 
the estimation is on programme countries, focus has also been extended for 
prolonged users, as a special case. Tables 2.2 and 2.4 highlight the 
significant determinants of economic- and political institutional quality of 
the countries that have remained under IMF programme at one time or the 
other, during the sample period (that is, programme countries). Moreover, 
Tables 2.3 and 2.5 estimate the significant determinants of economic- and 
political institutional quality with regard to prolonged users.  
 
To start with, it will be pertinent to indicate that the entire specifications 
pass the test of  Hansen-J statistic, which is concerned with Over-
Identifying Restrictions (OIR; Hansen, 1982); bringing in turn validity to 
the instruments at hand. Further support of the specification of the models 
is obtained from meeting both the F-test for the overall significance of the 
regression, and the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation. Moreover, the 
reported OIR test points out that all the instruments are exogenous
34
.  
 
The lag of both EIQ and PIQ remain positively significant for both 
programme countries and prolonged users, indicating high persistence in 
the evolution of institutional quality. This is in line with the path dependent 
nature of institutional evolution, where the past institutional setup feeds into 
the present; and forms an underlying reason for adopting the dynamic 
process in the current study.  
 
The dummy variable, regime, indicates whether a country has parliamentary 
or a  presidential form of government. The estimations indicate that regime 
is significantly positive throughout, which means that parliamentary form 
of government enhances both economic- and political institutional quality 
in programme countries, as well as prolonged users. 
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Table 2.2. Dependent variable -economic freedom index- programme 
countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag EFI 
0.824*** 0.921*** 0.818*** 0.845*** 0.773*** 0.509*** 0.875*** 0.836*** 0.747*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0696) (0.0499) (0.0585) (0.0578) (0.0403) (0.0595) (0.0620) (0.0343) (0.0397) (0.0389) 
Regime 
0.348*** 
        
0.164 
 (0.0923) 
        
(0.118) 
Military 
-0.0160 
        
0.0122 
 (0.111) 
        
(0.166) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
-0.0248 
       
0.111 
 
 
(0.108) 
       
(0.157) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
0.123 
       
0.0916 
 
 
(0.0970) 
       
(0.120) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.00695*** 
      
0.0107*** 
 
  
(0.00245) 
      
(0.00343) 
Civil Liberties 
   
0.0749*** 
     
0.0467 
 
   
(0.0276) 
     
(0.0304) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.0114*** 
    
0.00830 
 
    
(0.00317) 
    
(0.00805) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.00275 
   
-0.000998 
 
     
(0.00246) 
   
(0.00179) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
-0.00624 
   
-0.000795 
 
     
(0.00414) 
   
(0.00353) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.00142 
  
0.000396 
 
      
(0.00176) 
  
(0.00112) 
Property Rights 
       
0.00680*** 
 
-0.00333 
 
       
(0.00192) 
 
(0.00217) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.145*** -0.166 
 
        
(0.0392) (0.121) 
Constant 
0.982** 0.482 0.958*** 0.630** 0.825*** 3.277*** 0.796** 0.865*** 0.611*** 3.552*** 
  (0.448) (0.379) (0.332) (0.320) (0.200) (0.580) (0.372) (0.229) (0.213) (0.708) 
Observations 738 654 719 792 791 719 719 719 787 547 
Number of countries 89 84 96 96 95 94 94 94 96 82 
Hansen OIR test 0.396 0.515 0.998 0.198 1.000 1.000 0.482 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 1.99e-08 5.46e-07 4.09e-08 5.51e-09 3.47e-09 6.09e-06 8.59e-08 2.44e-08 1.83e-09 1.42e-05 
AR(2) 0.301 0.909 0.251 0.230 0.206 0.300 0.314 0.375 0.201 0.616 
AR(3) 0.802 0.652 0.818 0.706 0.550 0.954 0.727 0.816 0.474 0.0679 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
The impact of the chief executive being a military personal is next 
estimated. It can been seen from the estimation that, military (in power) 
significantly and negatively impacts political institutional quality in the 
case of both programme countries and prolonged users. At the same time, in 
the case of economic institutional quality while the negative impact 
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becomes insignificant in the case of programme countries, the impact 
remains negative and significant for prolonged users. 
 
Both the estimated Herfindahl Index Opposition and Herfindahl Index 
Government point out that excessive strength of either opposition or 
government in parliament remained inconsequential for improving 
institutional quality (in the case of programme countries and prolonged 
users).  
 
The estimated aggregate governance indicator indicates that improvement 
in the governance level has a positive consequence for economic 
institutional quality, in the case of programme countries and prolonged 
users. The same is true for political institutional quality in the case of 
programme countries, while the positive bearing of aggregate governance 
indicator becomes insignificant in the case of prolonged users. This 
significantly positive impact on institutional quality, underlines the 
importance of state in providing the right kind of environment for the 
market to function properly (Toye, 1993), which includes reducing the 
underlying transaction costs involved in the economic activity (a result 
emphasized by NIE). 
 
It is important to have civil liberties, as its estimated results for both 
programme countries and prolonged users hold a significantly positive 
bearing on institutional quality.  
  
Level of openness, which is captured by the KOF index of globalization, 
comes out to be a key player in improving overall institutional quality, 
since it is significantly positive in the case of programme countries, as well 
as prolonged users.  
 
Among other variables, monetary freedom and investment freedom are 
estimated to remain consequential for political institutional quality, since 
they have significantly positive bearing in the case of programme countries 
and prolonged users. The same positive impact becomes insignificant in the 
case of economic institutional quality. Moreover, estimated fiscal freedom 
does not significantly impact institutional quality.  
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Table 2.3. Dependent variable -economic freedom index- prolonged 
users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag EFI 
0.704*** 0.721*** 0.391*** 0.666*** 0.886*** 0.564*** 0.0228 0.0747 0.735*** 0.500*** 
 (0.0672) (0.0496) (0.0809) (0.0450) (0.0297) (0.0673) (0.0828) (0.0681) (0.0520) (0.0578) 
Regime 
0.149** 
        
0.275 
 (0.0633) 
        
(0.230) 
Military 
-0.193** 
        
-0.414** 
 (0.0925) 
        
(0.195) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
0.0487 
       
0.177 
 
 
(0.110) 
       
(0.126) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
0.219 
       
0.162 
 
 
(0.136) 
       
(0.159) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.0154*** 
      
0.0108** 
 
  
(0.00493) 
      
(0.00443) 
Civil Liberties 
   
0.0904** 
     
-0.0419 
 
   
(0.0402) 
     
(0.0426) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.00363* 
    
-0.00171 
 
    
(0.00214) 
    
(0.00598) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.00131 
   
-0.00167 
 
     
(0.00277) 
   
(0.00313) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
0.00465 
   
0.00204 
 
     
(0.00531) 
   
(0.00346) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.000752 
  
-0.000238 
 
      
(0.00238) 
  
(0.00178) 
Property Rights 
       
0.00188 
 
-0.00515 
 
       
(0.00393) 
 
(0.00315) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.130* -0.0905 
 
        
(0.0712) (0.180) 
Constant 
1.821*** 1.631*** 3.315*** 1.828*** 0.523*** 2.221*** 5.870*** 5.973*** 0.856** 3.665*** 
  (0.406) (0.364) (0.499) (0.314) (0.145) (0.559) (0.541) (0.485) (0.384) (1.064) 
Observations 297 283 272 301 301 293 293 293 298 251 
Number of countries 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.000401 9.75e-05 0.000212 5.23e-05 6.17e-05 0.000112 0.544 0.205 2.64e-05 0.000265 
AR(2) 0.0954 0.200 0.0177 0.0997 0.0910 0.0870 0.163 0.141 0.103 0.130 
AR(3) 0.177 0.165 0.286 0.143 0.183 0.108 0.316 0.259 0.203 0.576 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
The importance of property rights is paramount in the literature of NIE. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for example, pointed out that the reason 
why countries like UK and the Netherlands developed far quicker than its 
other neighbours is because of the protection of property rights that led to 
greater research, and innovation. The current study estimates that property  
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Table 2.4. Dependent variable -Polity II- programme countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag Polity II 
0.710*** 0.865*** -0.00518 0.686*** 0.674*** 0.605*** 0.566*** 0.781*** 0.921*** 0.864*** 
 (0.0502) (0.0431) (0.0592) (0.0315) (0.0471) (0.0579) (0.0550) (0.0338) (0.0150) (0.0437) 
Regime 
1.340*** 
        
0.0651 
 (0.340) 
        
(0.197) 
Military 
-0.522* 
        
-0.152 
 (0.285) 
        
(0.173) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
0.748 
       
0.00680 
 
 
(0.473) 
       
(0.277) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
0.347 
       
0.0472 
 
 
(0.528) 
       
(0.327) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.0817** 
      
-0.0135 
 
  
(0.0395) 
      
(0.0105) 
Civil Liberties 
   
1.108*** 
     
0.530*** 
 
   
(0.143) 
     
(0.204) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.0724*** 
    
0.00736 
 
    
(0.0123) 
    
(0.00859) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.0273** 
   
0.00188 
 
     
(0.0116) 
   
(0.00943) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
-0.0172 
   
-0.00219 
 
     
(0.0185) 
   
(0.00876) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.0621*** 
  
0.000173 
 
      
(0.0110) 
  
(0.00602) 
Property Rights 
       
0.0246** 
 
-0.00454 
 
       
(0.0115) 
 
(0.00739) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.0917 0.0552 
 
        
(0.0600) (0.104) 
Constant 
-1.082*** 0.716 -0.115 -4.577*** -3.628*** 0.908 -1.127** -0.0203 -0.961* -1.465 
  
(0.317) (0.743) (1.415) (0.560) (0.571) (1.764) (0.507) (0.445) (0.498) (1.023) 
Observations 2,722 1,841 1,179 2,892 2,845 1,444 1,444 1,444 2,721 902 
Number of cno 104 99 111 112 110 108 108 108 110 98 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 8.66e-11 8.02e-06 0.263 1.26e-10 0 1.22e-06 8.80e-06 1.40e-05 1.34e-10 0.0784 
AR(2) 0.674 0.279 0.135 0.854 0.827 0.233 0.318 0.316 0.599 0.181 
AR(3) 0.169 0.690 0.805 0.186 0.181 0.415 0.491 0.452 0.275 0.425 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
rights have a significantly positive impact in the case of political 
institutional quality in the case programme countries and prolonged users. 
Furthermore, while the impact remains significantly positive for economic 
institutional quality in the case of programme countries, the positive impact 
becomes insignificant in the case of prolonged users (may be due to the 
absence of complementing institutional framework, like rule of law that 
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efficiently enforces property rights to the extent that they significantly 
enhance economic institutional quality).  
 
Table 2.5. Dependent variable -Polity II- prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag Polity II 
0.634*** 0.763*** 0.674*** 0.645*** 0.577*** 0.648*** 0.388*** 0.594*** 0.907*** 0.895*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0501) (0.138) (0.0453) (0.0626) (0.0906) (0.0808) (0.0940) (0.0163) (0.0413) 
Regime 
0.938* 
        
0.276 
 (0.532) 
        
(0.229) 
Military 
-1.000** 
        
0.0619 
 (0.444) 
        
(0.272) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
-0.0950 
       
-0.388 
 
 
(0.375) 
       
(0.511) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
0.463 
       
0.120 
 
 
(0.717) 
       
(0.562) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.0159 
      
-0.00721 
 
  
(0.0355) 
      
(0.00938) 
Civil Liberties 
   
0.965*** 
     
0.312* 
 
   
(0.149) 
     
(0.165) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.0913*** 
    
0.0169* 
 
    
(0.0231) 
    
(0.00942) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.0228** 
   
0.00392 
 
     
(0.0109) 
   
(0.00869) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
0.0523 
   
0.00764 
 
     
(0.0343) 
   
(0.00827) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.0562*** 
  
-0.00405 
 
      
(0.0169) 
  
(0.00594) 
Property Rights 
       
0.0415* 
 
-0.00242 
 
       
(0.0226) 
 
(0.00907) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.248*** 0.00336 
 
        
(0.0694) (0.0964) 
Constant 
1.293** 0.0274 0.560 -4.771*** -3.211*** -4.601 -1.060 -0.883 -2.565*** -2.459* 
  
(0.515) (0.812) (1.209) (0.720) (1.050) (3.262) (1.104) (1.266) (0.739) (1.334) 
Observations 1,142 730 465 1,154 1,154 597 597 597 1,135 403 
Number of countries 42 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.920 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 1.03e-05 0.000795 0.112 2.38e-05 2.27e-05 0.00911 0.00265 0.0111 9.03e-06 0.122 
AR(2) 0.589 0.414 0.686 0.409 0.472 0.300 0.333 0.233 0.727 0.134 
AR(3) 0.314 0.315 0.578 0.520 0.388 0.354 0.387 0.351 0.417 0.859 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
Economic institutional quality, in the case of programme countries and 
prolonged users, is impacted positively and significantly by real economic 
growth. At the same time, impact on political institutional quality becomes 
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insignificant in the case of programme countries. Having said that, the 
estimated impact of real economic growth on political institutional quality 
comes out to be significant and positive in the case of prolonged users. 
 
It may be noted here, that all variables discussed above are estimated in one 
model (model/column[10]). It can be seen here that many of the variables 
lose their significance when taken together. Having said that, aggregate 
governance indicator, civil liberties, and KOF index of globalization remain 
positive and significant in terms of their impact for overall institutional 
quality; while military in power significantly reduces it. It may be that other 
determinants, although are significant individually, but in the absence of 
strong overall institutional quality of supporting institutional setup, they 
lose their significance when taken together. Hence, it is important that 
impact of institutional determinants is made stronger through enhanced 
focus on them and their supporting institutional environment. 
 
2.4.1. Robustness check 
 
The robustness check is to compare the programme countries results 
(Tables 2.2 and 2.4) with the overall member countries (Tables A2.1 and 
A2.2), respectively for both the economic- and political institutional 
quality. Most of the results are the same in both the programme- and overall 
member countries for the economic- and political institutional quality 
models, respectively. This shows that our results are robust for all countries.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The current study is an attempt to determine the variables that significantly 
impact both the economic- and political institutional quality in the IMF 
programme countries. While the results brought forth in the concluding 
remarks pertain to programme countries, the current study also looks at the 
special case of prolonged users. The panel data for the above groups of 
countries has been analysed for the period 1980-2009, which coincides with 
a time of active involvement of IMF with its member countries, in terms of 
both technical and financial support.  Furthermore, the analysis has been 
carried out using a System-GMM approach.  
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The results show that the dynamic process is highly persistent for both 
economic- and political institutional quality, highlighting the aspect of path 
dependent nature of evolution of institutional quality. As per estimations, a 
parliamentary form of government, aggregate governance indicator, civil 
liberties, level of openness, and property rights are conducive for enhancing 
overall institutional quality. Moreover, greater monetary- and investment 
freedom contribute positively to political institutional quality; while 
economic growth holds a positive consequence for economic institutional 
quality. On the other hand, military in power impacts negatively on political 
institutional quality. 
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Table A2.1. Dependent variable -economic freedom index- all member 
countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag EFI 
0.677*** 0.965*** 0.626*** 0.806*** 0.779*** 0.850*** 0.847*** 0.820*** 0.763*** 0.525*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0320) (0.0577) (0.0470) (0.0361) (0.0339) (0.0347) (0.0262) (0.0390) (0.0332) 
Regime 
0.380*** 
        
0.166 
 (0.0885) 
        
(0.123) 
Military 
-0.0930 
        
0.0337 
 (0.146) 
        
(0.150) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
-0.00228 
       
0.122 
 
 
(0.0283) 
       
(0.114) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
0.0311 
       
0.121 
 
 
(0.0271) 
       
(0.0869) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.0109** 
      
0.00802** 
 
  
(0.00533) 
      
(0.00318) 
Civil Liberties 
   
0.0758*** 
     
0.0475* 
 
   
(0.0195) 
     
(0.0258) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.00585*** 
    
0.0162** 
 
    
(0.00226) 
    
(0.00657) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.00413 
   
-0.000757 
 
     
(0.00299) 
   
(0.00153) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
0.00138 
   
-0.000313 
 
     
(0.00222) 
   
(0.00284) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.00125 
  
-0.00123 
 
      
(0.00152) 
  
(0.00102) 
Property Rights 
       
0.00552*** 
 
-0.00132 
 
       
(0.00113) 
 
(0.00188) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.0562** -0.176 
 
        
(0.0236) (0.123) 
Constant 
2.055*** 0.141 2.018*** 0.959*** 1.168*** 0.621** 0.988*** 0.984*** 1.158*** 3.041*** 
  (0.275) (0.222) (0.418) (0.278) (0.180) (0.245) (0.198) (0.159) (0.206) (0.654) 
Observations 1,071 933 1,051 1,164 1,146 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,150 796 
Number of countries 126 117 139 139 135 135 135 135 138 115 
Hansen OIR test 0.119 0.326 0.317 0.0985 1 1 0.980 0.999 1 1 
AR(1) 8.66e-09 1.87e-08 2.24e-08 7.26e-10 1.06e-10 7.84e-10 3.21e-09 1.17e-10 9.84e-10 1.46e-07 
AR(2) 0.0902 0.590 0.0921 0.0677 0.0645 0.0926 0.100 0.125 0.0561 0.801 
AR(3) 0.349 0.579 0.590 0.252 0.202 0.220 0.261 0.330 0.121 0.760 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table A2.2. Dependent variable -Polity II- all member countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lag Polity II 
0.785*** 0.828*** 0.0459 0.714*** 0.746*** 0.690*** 0.603*** 0.798*** 0.938*** 0.723*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0423) (0.0558) (0.0292) (0.0463) (0.0558) (0.0536) (0.0396) (0.0123) (0.0756) 
Regime 
1.449*** 
        
0.464 
 (0.357) 
        
(0.594) 
Military 
-0.254 
        
-0.0862 
 (0.240) 
        
(0.688) 
Herf. Index Opp. 
 
0.169 
       
-0.189 
 
 
(0.209) 
       
(0.350) 
Herf. Index Gov. 
 
-0.501 
       
-0.710 
 
 
(0.307) 
       
(0.465) 
Agg. Govern. Ind. 
  
0.0434 
      
0.0142 
 
  
(0.0295) 
      
(0.0140) 
Civil Liberties 
   
1.093*** 
     
0.684*** 
 
   
(0.138) 
     
(0.259) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
    
0.0508*** 
    
-0.00653 
 
    
(0.0105) 
    
(0.0186) 
Monetary Freedom 
     
0.0256** 
   
0.00114 
 
     
(0.0103) 
   
(0.00869) 
Fiscal Freedom 
     
-0.0251 
   
-0.00117 
 
     
(0.0165) 
   
(0.0116) 
Investment Freedom 
      
0.0661*** 
  
-0.00736 
 
      
(0.0106) 
  
(0.00527) 
Property Rights 
       
0.0104 
 
0.00452 
 
       
(0.00924) 
 
(0.00674) 
Log Real GDP 
        
0.0447 -0.139 
 
        
(0.0439) (0.168) 
Constant 
-0.674*** 1.271*** 0.973 -3.907*** -1.992*** 1.225 -2.301*** 1.358** -0.443 -0.394 
  
(0.233) (0.452) (1.309) (0.569) (0.466) (1.333) (0.518) (0.586) (0.334) (1.719) 
Observations 3,977 2,730 1,677 4,154 4,107 2,066 2,066 2,069 3,886 1,259 
Number of countries 149 134 157 158 156 154 154 154 155 133 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0 8.68e-06 0.116 0 0 5.34e-07 3.02e-06 1.33e-05 0 0.0412 
AR(2) 0.905 0.205 0.128 0.754 0.718 0.209 0.279 0.261 0.400 0.0526 
AR(3) 0.303 0.925 0.200 0.333 0.319 0.455 0.536 0.482 0.532 0.343 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Institutional quality, macroeconomic stabilization and 
economic growth: a case study of IMF programme 
countries 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction
35
 
 
During the last three decades or so, many countries have received once or 
have been prolonged users
36
 of International Monetary Fund (IMF; or 
simply the 'Fund') resources, but research literature points to the fact that 
most of them have not been able to achieve macroeconomic stability on a 
sustained basis (Evrensel, 2002; Easterly, 2005).  
 
Article IV, Section 1 of  IMF's Article of Agreement
37
, identifies one of the 
essential roles of IMF as a facilitator of member countries in reaching the 
objective of sustained economic growth. Notwithstanding the criticism of 
IMF programmes in terms of their neo-classical/monetarist basis, Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF; established in 1987)
38
 of the Fund 
for low-income countries, practically underlined the shifting focus of IMF 
from the surveillance and  BOP to both the BOP and growth objective. But, 
a programme basis well entrenched in orthodox economic thought, meant 
lack of any attempt by IMF to adopt more heterodox though process, for 
example in the shape of NIE, appears to have been a major cause for the 
                                                          
 
35
 There are two earlier versions of this paper. One can be found at 'Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive'(http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/). It was place there on 6th June, 2014 
(https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/secure/cgi/users/home?screen=EPrint%3A%3AView&eprintid=56370); 
while the other has been placed as a UB Economics (Faculty of Economics and Business, 
University of Barcelona) working paper (http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Paper-2_Omer-Javed.pdf).  
36
 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO, 2002, p. 9 and 24) indicates that a country which 
remains in an IMF programme for at least 7 years in a decade, is referred to as a 
prolonged user. 
37
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf 
38
 ESAF was later in 1999 renamed as, 'Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility' 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp). 
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non-performance of IMF programmes in terms of economic growth 
consequences for programme countries (especially the prolonged users). 
Hence, it has been pointed out that too much focus of the IMF on the 
demand side of the economy, at the cost of supply side, has led to the 
impact of IMF programmes at most being neutral (and in some countries 
even negative) on economic growth of programme countries (Haque and 
Khan, 1998; Bird, 2001; Bird, 2007; Arpac et al., 2008).  
 
NIE (New Institutional Economics) literature, on the other hand, indicates 
that countries which saw improvement in institutional quality, also 
witnessed their income per capita improving (Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005; Afonso and Jalles, 2011).  Actually, NIE points out that by focusing 
on improving determinants of institutional quality (for example, by 
reducing transaction costs, by protecting property rights, by ensuring 
enforcement of contracts, and by improving rule of law, etc.) the overall 
institutional environment improves, and has a positive impact  on both the 
macroeconomic situation and economic growth. 
 
Given the consequence of IMF programmes at most being neutral for 
economic growth, on one hand, and institutional determinants significantly 
and positively affecting economic growth in countries overall, on the other 
hand, the paper intends to explore the possibility that significant 
institutional determinants (obtained from chapter 2) positively impact real 
GDP both directly, and then indirectly through the macroeconomic stability 
channel, in IMF programme countries.  
 
The study is structured in the following way: relevant literature is reviewed 
in Section 3.2, followed by discussion of data and methodology in Section 
3.3, while Section 3.4 highlights estimation and results. Conclusion of the 
study is given in the last section (which is Section 3.5). 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
 
Ever since the Third World Debt crisis of the 1980s, IMF enhanced its role, 
mainly through its structural adjustment window; resulting in turn, in 
greater focus of economic research to gauge the impact of IMF programmes 
on the economic performance of recipient countries. 
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A lot of countries have been under the IMF programmes during the last 
three decades. Therefore, there has been an effort by researchers to 
understand the impact of these programmes, for which different approaches 
have been employed. Haque and Khan (1998; p. 7) pointed out that the 
difference between these methodologies fundamentally lay in the way the 
'counterfactual' was formulated, which served as a benchmark to gauge the 
performance of the 'actual outcome' against a macroeconomic outcome 
existing in a world of no programme (i.e., the 'counterfactual').  
 
Haque and Khan (1998; p. 8-12) indicated that due to informational 
constraints with regard to structural parameters and policy reaction function 
parameters, different programme evaluation methods construct 
counterfactuals differently; with approaches being (i) before-after (BA; 
evaluates macroeconomic performance under and before the programme; 
but suffers from over-simplification by excluding the impact of any 
exogenous factors), (ii) with-without (WW; where a group of non-
programme countries is taken as a 'control group' and the performance of a 
programme country is compared with it; with major shortcoming in terms 
of assuming that programme and non-programme countries are same prior 
to the start of the programme, which is especially problematic given the 
programme country is crisis hit to start with, suffering in turn the non-
random selection bias with regard to selection of programme countries), 
(iii) generalized evaluation estimator (GEE) approach (while it also 
compares programme and non-programme countries, it controls for initial 
conditions and exogenous influences), and (iv) comparison of simulations 
(SIM; compares simulated performance of countries under hypothetical 
Fund programmes and non-Fund policies; but has the shortcoming that the 
required underlying econometric model that captured the whole spectrum of 
a typical Fund programme, is not available). 
 
Using BA approach, while Khan and Knight (1981) reported a negative 
impact, Killick et al. (1992) pointed towards a positive impact of IMF 
programmes on economic growth of recipient countries; where Evrensel 
(2002) indicated a neutral impact on economic growth. Similarly using 
WW approach, while Donovan (1981) found out a positive impact of Fund 
programmes on economic growth, Loxley (1984) pointed towards a neutral 
effect on growth. Hence, the underlying weak assumptions with regard to 
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formulation of counterfactual in the BA and WW approaches may be the 
reason why different studies using these methodologies produced results 
that are all over the place, making it difficult to conclude anything 
substantively with regard to the impact of IMF programmes on economic 
growth of recipient countries.  
 
Having said that, formulation of a more informed counterfactual, using 
GEE methodology gave more consistent results, which more often than not 
indicated that Fund programmes had a negative impact on economic growth 
of recipient countries. Hence, for example, Goldstein and Montiel (1986) 
using data from 1974-1981, and employing GEE methodology pointed out 
a negative impact of Fund programmes on economic growth. Similarly, 
Barro and Lee (2005) using GEE methodology (and by employing data 
from 1975 to 2000) indicated that Fund lending retarded economic growth. 
Also, Dreher (2006), who covered a time period from 1970-2000, pointed 
out an overall negative impact on economic growth. Furthermore, Nsouli et 
al. (2004) also indicated that Fund programmes remained neutral in terms 
of their impact on economic growth.  
 
A further review of literature to see the detailed impact of IMF programmes 
revealed a poor  performance in terms of individual macroeconomic 
indicators of recipient countries, along with highlighting the emergence and 
persistence of recidivism in IMF programme countries. While Khan (1990) 
and Pastor (1987) discovered significant positive impacts on the overall 
balance of payments, Conway (2006) indicated that the impact had reduced 
since the 1970s and 1980s. Evrensel (2002; p. 586) found out that previous 
programme countries entered a new one at the back of an even worse 
macroeconomic situation (as compared to the situation when they were not 
in the programme in the first place), because of the existence of moral 
hazard in terms of easily available financing. Also, he indicated that 
significant improvement achieved in terms of current account and foreign 
exchange reserves, could not be sustained after the programme ended. 
Similarly, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), using data from 1951 to 1990, 
showed that countries in a programme saw their growth rates decreasing; 
whereas the same countries otherwise grew faster once they left the 
programme. 
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Moreover,  research conducted by Barro and Lee (2005) did not see any 
significant consequence of IMF programmes for either investment or 
inflation; and could not find positive consequence on economic growth in 
recipient countries, which remained frequent borrowers from IMF. Bird 
(1996) pointed out that till the time Fund programmes put improving 
economic growth as the top priority on its agenda, recipient countries would 
continue to remain recidivist. Similar consequence was highlighted by 
Hutchison and Noy (2003) while gauging the impact of Fund programmes 
in Latin American, pointed out low programme completion rates and 
recidivism, high output costs, and no improvement in current account. 
 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) using actual monetary values of IMF 
lending (rather than the number of programmes approved by the Fund, 
since according to the them there remained a high level of non-completion 
of IMF programmes) pointed out that while Fund's overall objective for 
crisis-hit countries was to put them on stable economic growth footings, yet 
the impact of Fund programmes in this regard, was either neutral or 
negative, given their policies had an adverse impact for public and private 
investment; revealing in turn that the Fund in putting too much emphasis on 
the demand side, neglected the supply side of the economy in the process. 
One of the main steps in this regard according to NIE, is improving 
institutions so that the transaction costs can be lowered to induce 
investment (which in turn helps boost economic growth). 
 
With regard to the prolonged users, Easterly (2005) indicated that during 
1980-1999 these countries were unable to achieve either reasonable growth 
or deal convincingly with macroeconomic distortions.  
 
Given this background, while the Fund also realized and internalized this 
performance and criticism (IMF 2005a; IEO, 2007), researchers have 
criticized and asked IMF to improve its Financial Programming Framework 
(FPP) for better results for recipient countries in terms of consequences for 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth (IEO, 2007; Bird and 
Willett, 2004). For instance, Bird (2007) found the criticism to be legitimate 
since it found IMF programmes to be 'over simplistic'. Moreover, Buira 
(1983) called on the Fund to revisit its financial programming techniques 
for certain cases. Also, Bird (2001) asked IMF to redesign its programmes. 
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More specifically, Abbot et al. (2010) while analyzing impact of 
programmes on developing countries, criticized Fund to be too rigid and 
conventional/uniform in its approach in terms of its conditionalities
39
, and 
this formed as one of the reasons for its impact neutral performance with 
regard to economic growth; in turn asked for a fresh approach. 
  
In terms of suggesting specific remedies, Khan and Knight (1985), for 
instance, indicated the negative impact on economic growth could be 
restricted to short-term in case supply-side policies were pursued. 
Moreover, Arpac et al. (2008) suggested to IMF to focus on domestic 
politics also, while forming expectations about the extent of programme 
implementation in a country. At the same time, Nsouli et al. (2004) pointed 
out that most research on gauging impact of Fund programmes did not take 
into account the underlying role of institutional quality in programme 
success rate. Furthermore, pointed out that in programme countries, better 
institutional quality and conducive political environment had positive 
consequences for macroeconomic outcomes, and programme 
implementation rates.  
 
Research literature of NIE has found that improvement in institutional 
determinants had an overall positive and significant bearing on the 
economic growth of countries (for example, Rodrik et al., 2002; Hall and 
Jones, 1999). For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2004) while analyzing the 
different institutions of North and South Korea, pointed out that unlike the 
North, in the South, political and economic institutions were strengthened 
for example by policy decisions that were taken democratically, and which 
protected private property, and developed markets. This led to greater 
economic growth and development in South Korea over the years, as 
compared to North Korea, even though both countries shared the same 
culture since they were one country under the Japanese occupation (which 
ended in 1945, and the division subsequently). Similarly, improvement in 
institutions (both political and economic) led Botswana experience very 
                                                          
 
39
 The process of conditionality is whereby installments are released on a quarterly basis, 
at the back of successfully meeting benchmarks, which are pre-decided with regard to 
performance (Barro and Lee, 2005, p.1248). 
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high growth rates during the last three decades or so (Acemoglu et al., 
2003a; Parsons and Robinson, 2006).  
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Theoretical design 
 
The main motivation of the current study is based on the 'missing link', 
which identifies itself as the effect of institutions on economic growth of 
IMF programme countries; given the background of a poor  performance of 
IMF programmes for recipient countries in terms of economic growth 
consequence (mainly due to insufficient focus on the supply side of the 
economy) and the importance of institutions in improving growth rates in 
countries, as revealed by the research literature of NIE. Hence, the current 
study makes an effort to explore this 'missing link' by analysing the impact 
of institutional determinants on economic growth of IMF programme 
countries, with the underlying premise that improvement in institutional 
determinants both directly, and indirectly (through the channel of 
macroeconomic stability) positively impact real GDP. 
 
As indicated earlier, NIE literature indicates that enhancement in the quality 
of institutions has a significantly positive bearing on real economic growth 
(Rodrik et al., 2002; Ugur, 2010). In the current analysis, the same is being 
premised for IMF programme countries: 
 
Real GDP = f (institutional determinants, other variables)         [a]   
   (+) 
 
At the same time, it has been advocated, for example by Acemoglu et al. 
(2003b) that the main reason behind macroeconomic instability (MI) and 
the varying levels of macroeconomic volatility among different countries 
were related more with institutional reasons than the traditionally identified 
macroeconomic determinants. Similarly, better budgetary institutions 
(which are important economic institutions) had a negatively significant 
impact on (budget) deficit (von Hagen, 1991). Hence, the current study 
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considers the notion that improvement in institutional determinants in IMF 
programme countries negatively impact macroeconomic instability: 
 
 
MI = f (institutional determinants, other variables)         [b] 
   (-)   
 
In a case study of Iran conducted by Haghighi et al. (2012) it was pointed 
out that there existed a long-term relation between economic growth and 
macroeconomic instability. Therefore, lastly, it is also premised here that 
macroeconomic instability has a negative bearing on real GDP in IMF 
programme countries: 
 
Real GDP = f (macroeconomic instability, other variables)                       [c] 
   (-) 
 
For the purpose of analysis, the institutional determinants to be employed 
will be the significant determinants of institutional quality taken from 
chapter 2. 
 
3.3.2.  Sample 
 
Out of the total IMF member countries at 188, countries that have remained 
under the IMF programme  at one time or the other (otherwise called 
'programme countries') have been found out to stand at 129 during the 
sample period (1980-2009). Furthermore, for the purposes of analysis, 
programme countries have been sub-divided into two groups of 'prolonged 
users' and 'non-prolonged users
40
'. They stand at 44 and 85, respectively, 
during the same time period. At the same time, for the purpose of drawing 
lessons from countries that have never been under an IMF programme 
during the time period taken, non-programme countries have also been 
taken; which stand at 59
41
.  
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 The author has used the terminology of non-prolonged users to represent a group of 
programme countries that have remained under an IMF programme for less than 7 years 
in a decade. 
41
 See Table A.3.4 for group-wise list of IMF member countries during 1980-2009. 
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3.3.3. Data and variable description 
 
Data on real GDP is taken from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the 
IMF
42
.  
 
Based on the methodology and definitions of Ismihan (2003), 
Macroeconomic Instability Index (MII)
43
 has been constructed using the 
following five
44
 indicators: 
 
(i) Inflation rate (calculated by taking data on average consumer prices from 
WEO), 
 
(ii) budget deficit as percentage of GDP (taken from WEO),  
 
(iii) general government gross debt as percentage of GDP (obtained from 
WEO),  
 
(iv) exchange rate variability has been calculated on the basis of 12 month 
end-of-period nominal exchange rate in SDR, taken from International 
Finance Statistics (IFS; IMF)
45
 and, 
 
(v) Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (REER; taken from WDI
46
 of the 
World Bank). This indicator has been included in Ismihan (2003) to 
augment MII to include the impact of competitiveness in it. Furthermore, it 
needs to be indicated that there exists another index in this regard called the 
Macroeconomic Stability Subindex
47
, produced by World Economic 
Forum. The reason it has not been employed in the current analysis is 
because of lack of consistency of its methodology; in turn, inhibiting 
comparability of data over longer periods of time.  
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 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/download.aspx 
43
 For details, see Ismihan (2003; pp. 214-15), who constructed MII. 
44
 It may be indicated here that while Ismihan (2003) only included the first four 
indicators to construct the MII, the current study augments it with one more indicator. 
45
 Data taken from IFS CD ROM (IMF). 
46
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicator 
47
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/GCR_05_06/C
omposition_of_the_Growth_Competitiveness_Index 
46 
 
Political/governance indicators. From chapter 2, significant variables 
include regime (is a dummy variable indicating 0 for presidential, and 1 for 
parliamentary form of government), military (chief executive a military 
officer or not; existence of it is represented by 1, 0 otherwise), civil liberties 
(data on civil liberties is taken from Freedom in the World (publication of 
Freedom House)
48
; where, the least rating of degree of freedom is indicated 
by 1, while the highest rating is represented by 7), and aggregate 
governance indicator (a simple average of the five indicators taken from 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI; World Bank)
49
, produced by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2010)
50
; where these five 
indicators cover aspects with regard to the level of voice and accountability, 
effectiveness of government, the situation of rule of law, the quality of 
regulations, and the extent of control of corruption).  
 
Economic variables. From chapter 2 significant variables include KOF 
Index of Globalization
51
 (a proxy of openness), three measures of economic 
freedom and prosperity and are monetary freedom, investment freedom, and 
property rights (taken from the Index of Economic Freedom
52
). The other 
significant determinant of institutional quality from chapter 2 is real GDP, 
which has not been included here, since the dependent variable is also real 
GDP.  
  
Control variables. They include government spending and population 
taken from WDI. 
 
Endogeneity. Based on literature review (for instance discussion of 
institutions in NIE literature; see for example Acemoglu et al., 2001), it has 
been realized that the problem of endogeneity exists for many variables. In 
the current study, variables that may be affected by endogeneity issue 
include MII, government spending, aggregate governance indicator, KOF 
Index of Globalization, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and 
property rights. It may be indicated here that as lagged dependent variable 
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 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 
49
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators 
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 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
51
 http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
52
 http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
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is correlated with the error term, so lagged real GDP and lagged MII may 
cause endogeneity problem in the regression. 
 
3.3.4. Econometric methodology 
 
As explained in the theoretical design, the purpose here is to estimate the 
impact of institutional determinants (obtained from chapter 2) both directly 
and then indirectly (through MII) on real GDP, in terms of the two sub-
groups of programme countries, i.e. 'prolonged users' and 'non-prolonged 
users'. Therefore, in line with the design, the first equation will be estimated 
as follows:  
 
      =                                          [1] 
 
where,        stands for log real GDP.    are the country-fixed 
effects.           stands for lagged log real GDP.     is a vector of 
significant political/governance indicators, and     is a vector of significant 
economic variables from chapter 2; while     is a vector of control 
variables.    are the time specific effects.     is the error term. 
 
While Eq[1] is estimated to check the direct impact of significant 
determinants of institutional quality on real GDP, the next two equations 
will together indirectly estimate this impact, as follows:  
 
     =                                           [2] 
 
where, MII stands for Macroeconomic Instability Index, while          
stands for lagged MII.  
 
 are the country-fixed effects, while    ,    , once 
again are a vector of significantly positive determinants of institutional 
quality from chapter 2;  
 
 are the time specific effects, and  
  
 is the error 
term. 
 
and, 
 
      =                        +       +          [3] 
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where,        stands for log real GDP.    are the country-fixed 
effects.           stands for lagged log real GDP.       stands for predicted 
values of MII from Eq [2].     are the control variables.    are the time 
specific effects, while  
  
 is the error term. 
 
Hence, in Eq [2], the impact of significant determinants of institutional 
quality is investigated on MII, while in Eq [3] the impact of predicted MII 
is explored on real GDP. 
 
The underlying premise for employing this indirect approach is to see the 
importance of institutional focus for IMF programmes in improving 
macroeconomic stability, and also, economic growth. The basis for this here 
is that as institutional quality improves, it will reduce macroeconomic 
instability, and also as macroeconomic instability decreases it will enhance 
real GDP. 
 
The above equations (Eq[1] to Eq[3]) are being estimated using Arellano 
and Bover (1995) approach. The big advantage of this approach is that it 
uses the information in the equations simultaneously in level and as well as 
difference forms. For this purpose, we take the difference of all equations, 
as follows: 
 
                                            +     [4] 
 
                                   +       [5] 
 
                                       +      [6] 
 
These equations also serve the purpose of removing any possible 
heterogeneity in the models above (where   indicates change for a variable 
between years t and t-1).  
 
For the estimation of the models, like the ones above, the approach of 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) has been recommended by 
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Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)
53
. The GMM 
approach, in the estimation of these types of models, enhances efficiency 
through addition of more instruments to the system of equations, i.e. in 
level and difference. Furthermore, all available lagged values of 
endogenous variables are used as instruments to resolve the problem of 
autocorrelation. All the above models are estimated using robust standard 
errors to address the problem of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
 
3.4. Estimation and Results 
 
All the models have been estimated separately on the two sub-groups of 
programme countries, being 'prolonged users' and 'non-prolonged users'. 
The reason behind taking these two groups is based on the inherent 
difference in economic environment of these two sub-groups, where the 
prolonged users are generally composed of very underdeveloped economies 
(and hence the need for entering frequent IMF programmes), while the non-
prolonged users are more representative of economies that are overall more 
developed than the prolonged users. Moreover, estimations have also been 
made for the purpose of understanding the importance of significant 
determinants of institutional quality in programme countries, in the case of 
non-programme countries (that never entered an IMF programme during 
1980-2009). 
 
Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) highlight the impact of institutional determinants 
on real GDP for prolonged and non-prolonged users, respectively. On the 
other hand, Tables 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), estimate the impact of institutional 
determinants on MII (once again for both prolonged and non-prolonged 
users). Thereafter, Tables 3.3(a) and 3.3(b), estimate the impact of predicted 
MII (   ) on real GDP (in terms of the two sub-groups of programme 
countries). At the same time, as an extension, Tables A3.1, A3.2, and A3.3 
indicate estimations for the case of non-programme countries. 
 
                                                          
53
 Like in the previous chapter, the 'xtabond2' command has been employed to estimate 
the above system. 
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Upfront it may be pertinent to indicate that instruments were valid and 
exogenous
54
, since they passed the Hansen-J statistic test of Over-
Identifying Restrictions (OIR; Hansen, 1982).  
 
In Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b), lagged real GDP is positive and significant for 
real GDP in the case of both prolonged users and non-prolonged users; 
hence, highlighting the presence of dynamic process. The same 
consequence can be observed in the case of non-programme countries 
(Table A3.1). At the same time, in both the sub-groups of program 
countries, population in many of the models has a significantly negative 
bearing on real GDP, while government spending overall has a positive 
consequence for real GDP. The two control variables remain insignificant 
for real GDP, in the case of non-programme countries. 
 
It can be seen in Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) through the estimated institutional 
determinant ‘regime’, that as compared to presidential form of democracy, 
parliamentary form of democracy is more conducive for enhancing real 
GDP. The same consequence holds for the non-programme countries (Table 
A3.1). At the same time, a military officer as chief executive is detrimental 
to improvement in real GDP (i.e. has a significantly negatively impact) for 
the two sub-groups of the programme countries; while the negative impact 
remains insignificant in the case of non-programme countries. Moreover, 
civil liberties positively and significantly contribute in enhancing real GDP 
in the case of non-prolonged users (and the non-programme countries), 
while the positive impact remains insignificant in the case of prolonged 
users.  
 
Aggregate governance indicator comes out to be highly important in 
enhancing real economic growth, since it holds significantly positive 
consequence for real GDP, for both the prolonged and non-prolonged users 
(and also in the case of non-programme countries). 
 
The importance of openness of the economy is reflected in KOF index of 
globalization having a significantly positive impact on real GDP, for both 
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the programme and non-programme countries. Also, monetary freedom 
significantly enhances real GDP for both the sub-groups (while the impact  
remains positive but insignificant in the case of non-programme countries). 
At the same time while investment freedom holds a positive (though 
insignificant) consequence for real GDP in the case of non-prolonged users 
(and also the non-programme countries), it holds a significantly positive 
bearing on real GDP in the case of prolonged users. 
 
Table 3.1(a). Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 0.973*** 0.804*** 0.877*** 0.510*** 0.351*** 1.005*** 0.342*** 0.942*** 
 
(0.00946) (0.0347) (0.0226) (0.0768) (0.0600) (0.00434) (0.0660) (0.0326) 
Log Population 0.000873 0.0194 -0.0979** -0.190*** -0.187*** -0.00555** -0.199*** 0.00841 
 
(0.00381) (0.0256) (0.0464) (0.0561) (0.0592) (0.00232) (0.0605) (0.00799) 
Government Spending -0.000118 -0.000120 0.000156 3.86e-05 0.000354** 0.000375* 0.000363** -4.76e-05 
 
(0.000190) (0.000286) (0.000237) (0.000366) (0.000148) (0.000219) (0.000150) (0.000245) 
Regime 0.0348** 
      
0.0770** 
 
(0.0152) 
      
(0.0380) 
Military -0.0280** 
      
-0.0641** 
 
(0.0120) 
      
(0.0256) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
0.00133*** 
     
-1.52e-05 
  
(0.000465) 
     
(0.000779) 
Civil Liberties 
  
0.00694 
    
0.000355 
   
(0.00544) 
    
(0.00741) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
0.00438** 
   
0.000506 
    
(0.00195) 
   
(0.00135) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
0.000349** 
  
-0.000302 
     
(0.000166) 
  
(0.000365) 
Investment Freedom 
     
0.000578** 
 
4.72e-05 
      
(0.000258) 
 
(0.000288) 
Property Rights 
      
0.000176 -0.00129 
       
(0.000263) (0.000817) 
Constant 0.201*** 0.977** 2.420*** 6.320*** 7.580*** -0.0112 7.563*** 0.351** 
  (0.0755) (0.487) (0.888) (1.131) (1.240) (0.0423) (1.254) (0.156) 
Observations 590 449 596 596 596 596 596 445 
Number of countries 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.000819 0.114 0.000556 0.0208 0.375 0.000716 0.366 0.0753 
AR(2) 0.137 0.104 0.137 0.781 0.603 0.211 0.345 0.0862 
AR(3) 0.208 0.0892 0.402 0.597 0.122 0.283 0.0327 0.412 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table 3.1(b). Dependent variable -real GDP- non-prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 0.819*** 0.817*** 0.965*** 0.892*** 0.869*** 0.727*** 0.732*** 0.856*** 
 (0.0740) (0.0383) (0.0208) (0.0338) (0.0446) (0.0822) (0.0817) (0.0432) 
Log Population -0.0454* -0.0291** -0.00356 -0.0252** -0.0946 -0.0667** -0.0658** -0.0205 
 (0.0269) (0.0141) (0.00581) (0.0122) (0.0856) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0138) 
Government Spending -7.08e-05 0.000170 0.000154 0.000341* 0.000119 -3.98e-05 7.76e-05 -0.000286 
 (0.000246) (0.000283) (0.000392) (0.000205) (0.000224) (0.000205) (0.000193) (0.000341) 
Regime 0.113* 
      
-0.0220 
 (0.0657) 
      
(0.0248) 
Military -0.0619* 
      
0.0150 
 (0.0376) 
      
(0.0398) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
0.00352*** 
     
0.00351*** 
 
 
(0.000986) 
     
(0.000850) 
Civil Liberties 
  
0.0139* 
    
0.00349 
 
  
(0.00723) 
    
(0.00458) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
0.00293** 
   
0.00272** 
 
   
(0.00120) 
   
(0.00127) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
0.000656** 
  
0.000656 
 
    
(0.000297) 
  
(0.000672) 
Investment Freedom 
     
0.000317 
 
8.07e-06 
 
     
(0.000486) 
 
(0.000620) 
Property Rights 
      
0.000219 0.000439 
 
      
(0.000324) (0.000539) 
Constant 2.116** 1.718*** 0.248 1.054** 2.502 3.206*** 3.121*** 1.107** 
  (0.966) (0.459) (0.214) (0.422) (1.608) (1.018) (0.992) (0.435) 
Observations 884 726 959 960 963 963 963 665 
Number of countries 70 77 75 77 77 77 77 69 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.0214 0.0679 0.0361 0.0295 0.0312 0.0134 0.0136 0.0432 
AR(2) 0.0309 0.143 0.0448 0.0510 0.0378 0.0503 0.0501 0.174 
AR(3) 
0.176 0.299 0.193 0.195 0.202 0.118 0.124 0.341 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
Property rights play an important role in reducing transaction costs (that 
helps enhance investment). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005; p. 953) pointed 
out that countries where institutions protected property rights more, 
performed better in terms of indictors related with investment, credit to 
private sector, stock markets, and income per capita. A similar result is 
pointed out by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in terms of Netherlands and 
UK paying greater attention to developing private property protection 
institutional framework, and in turn growing quicker than their neighbours. 
Having said that, estimated property rights remain positive but insignificant 
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for real GDP for both the sub-groups.  It may be possible that by 
strengthening the supporting institutional setup, the impact of property 
rights on real GDP could become more effective (or in other words, 
significant); since the variable of property rights has been estimated to be 
positively significant in the non-programme countries, which are overall 
more developed than the programme countries, in terms of their 
institutional setup.  
 
Moreover, model (8) in which all institutional determinants have been taken 
together, indicates results, which are overall in line with the results of the 
individual models, although due to the lack of overall weak supporting 
institutional environment, certain institutional determinants (which 
individually remain positive and significant in enhancing real GDP) 
become insignificant in terms of their impact on real GDP. Hence, it is 
important that impact of institutional determinants is made stronger through 
enhanced focus on them and their supporting institutional environment. 
 
It may be pertinent here to indicate that the discussion will now move 
towards estimating and analysing Eq[2] for the purpose of establishing the 
first part (i.e., institutional impact on MII) of the overall indirect effect of 
institutional determinants on real GDP through macroeconomic stability. 
Tables 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), once again highlight the presence of dynamic 
process, since lagged MII positively and significantly impacts current MII, 
for both the prolonged and non-prolonged users. The same consequence can 
be observed in the case of non-programme countries (see Table A3.2). 
 
In the case of prolonged users, a military officer as chief executive 
significantly enhances MII. Moreover, the role of particular form of regime 
(parliamentary or presidential) remains insignificant in impacting MII. 
 
Aggregate governance indicator remains negative, though insignificantly 
for MII in the case of both prolonged- and non-prolonged users; while the 
impact is significantly negative in the case of non-programme countries. 
Also civil liberties holds a significantly negative consequence for prolonged 
users; the impact remains insignificant in the case of non-prolonged users 
and non-programme countries. 
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Table 3.2(a). Dependent variable -Macroeconomic Instability Index- 
prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag MII 0.509*** 0.405*** 0.272*** 0.514*** 0.340*** 0.379*** 0.344*** 0.512*** 
 
(0.0410) (0.0624) (0.0794) (0.0367) (0.106) (0.0867) (0.0464) (0.0462) 
Regime -0.00869 
      
-0.0262 
 
(0.0250) 
      
(0.0179) 
Military 0.0414** 
      
0.0307** 
 
(0.0201) 
      
(0.0147) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.00139 
     
0.000108 
  
(0.00103) 
     
(0.000924) 
Civil Liberties 
  
-0.0113** 
    
-0.00582 
   
(0.00555) 
    
(0.00702) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.00171*** 
   
-0.00129* 
    
(0.000524) 
   
(0.000733) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.00234** 
  
0.000719 
     
(0.000955) 
  
(0.000567) 
Investment Freedom 
     
-0.00251 
 
0.000347 
      
(0.00200) 
 
(0.000572) 
Property Rights 
      
-0.00145 0.00121 
       
(0.00102) (0.000887) 
Constant 0.230*** 0.439*** 0.338*** 0.319*** 0.448*** 0.387*** 0.320*** 0.211*** 
 
(0.0227) (0.138) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0756) (0.104) (0.0442) (0.0650) 
Observations 1,089 484 1,153 1,153 599 599 599 448 
Number of countries 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 0.765 1.000 0.960 0.969 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 3.37e-07 8.00e-05 0.000114 1.12e-07 0.00230 8.12e-05 1.09e-05 7.76e-05 
AR(2) 0.0952 0.0536 0.0288 0.0791 0.00377 0.0147 0.00505 0.0684 
AR(3) 0.117 0.0157 0.127 0.0804 0.960 0.571 0.588 0.00492 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
Arpac et al. (2008), for instance, indicated that implementation record of 
IMF programmes  was better in those programme countries, as compared to 
others, where the level of trade openness improved. Similarly, in the current 
study, it can be seen that an improvement in KOF index of globalization 
significantly reduces MII in both the sub- groups, highlighting the 
importance of openness here. Also, monetary freedom remains significantly 
negative in the case of prolonged users. 
 
The situation of investment freedom is a bit complex, where estimated 
investment freedom significantly enhances MII in the case of non- 
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Table 3.2(b). Dependent variable -Macroeconomic Instability Index- 
non-prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag MII 0.585*** 0.437*** 0.639*** 0.488*** 0.513*** 0.591*** 0.324* 0.539*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0902) (0.0426) (0.0328) (0.0382) (0.0419) (0.170) (0.0964) 
Regime -0.0671 
      
0.0478 
 (0.0410) 
      
(0.0389) 
Military 0.00110 
      
0.00212 
 (0.0267) 
      
(0.0241) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.000509 
     
-0.00602 
 
 
(0.00201) 
     
(0.00378) 
Civil Liberties 
  
0.00274 
    
0.0394 
 
  
(0.00255) 
    
(0.0371) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.00322* 
   
-0.00313 
 
   
(0.00167) 
   
(0.00580) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.000134 
  
0.00198 
 
    
(0.000509) 
  
(0.00196) 
Investment Freedom 
     
0.00106** 
 
0.00205 
 
     
(0.000512) 
 
(0.00163) 
Property Rights 
      
-7.41e-05 0.00415 
 
      
(0.00304) (0.00283) 
Constant 0.283*** 0.221** 0.218*** 0.458*** 0.289*** 0.208*** 0.211 0.0198 
 (0.0256) (0.0940) (0.0185) (0.0961) (0.0424) (0.0290) (0.197) (0.224) 
Observations 1,844 917 2,000 2,066 996 996 996 679 
Number of countries 74 84 81 82 79 79 79 70 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.293 1.000 
AR(1) 0 0.00765 3.72e-09 0 3.00e-05 1.15e-05 0.0381 0.000249 
AR(2) 0.126 0.616 0.659 0.517 0.0214 0.0214 0.00726 0.758 
AR(3) 
0.398 0.441 0.435 0.621 0.0502 0.0388 0.173 0.424 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
prolonged users, while the impact remains significantly negative in the case 
of non-programme countries. Hence, unlike non-programme countries 
where institutional mechanism is better established with regard to fiscal 
freedom, absence of needed controls on fiscal freedom for checking capital 
flight (for example the case of East Asian crisis of the 1990s) may be one of 
the weaknesses in the overall fiscal freedom environment that may have led 
to such an estimated positive consequence for MII; calling in turn, for 
augmenting pro-investment institutional setup in the case of non-prolonged 
users. 
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Table 3.3(a). Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 
0.997*** 0.809*** 0.993*** 1.000*** 0.983*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 0.991*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0340) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0162) (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.00981) 
Log population 
-0.0140*** 0.0192 -0.0165*** -0.0134*** -0.0214*** -0.00320 -0.00347 -0.00173 
 
(0.00517) (0.0250) (0.00519) (0.00468) (0.00709) (0.00319) (0.00303) (0.00380) 
Government Spending 
-0.000134 -0.000180 -3.07e-05 -0.000206 -6.49e-05 5.19e-06 -8.58e-05 0.000106 
 
(0.000459) (0.000278) (0.000419) (0.000407) (0.000561) (0.000367) (0.000365) (0.000377) 
Predicted MII: Regime & Military 
-0.0676 
       
 (0.0684) 
       
Predicted MII: Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.104*** 
      
 
 
(0.0351) 
      
Predicted MII: Civil Liberties 
  
-0.0766 
     
 
  
(0.0975) 
     
Predicted MII: KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.0783 
    
 
   
(0.0587) 
    
Predicted MII: Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.0628 
   
 
    
(0.145) 
   
Predicted MII: Investment Freedom 
     
-0.220** 
  
 
     
(0.106) 
  
Predicted MII: Property Rights 
      
-0.187** 
 
 
      
(0.0819) 
 
Predicted MII: All Institutional Det. 
       
-0.201*** 
 
       
(0.0581) 
Constant 
0.300*** 1.050** 0.338*** 0.250** 0.490*** 0.132* 0.124* 0.188*** 
  
(0.113) (0.478) (0.114) (0.101) (0.179) (0.0708) (0.0652) (0.0438) 
Observations 
590 449 596 596 596 596 596 445 
Number of countries 
42 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 
Hansen OIR test 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992 0.989 0.999 1.000 
AR(1) 
0.000690 0.137 0.000757 0.000647 0.000934 0.000508 0.000461 0.00858 
AR(2) 
0.158 0.103 0.144 0.141 0.143 0.156 0.111 0.216 
AR(3) 
0.118 0.0716 0.199 0.136 0.247 0.158 0.102 0.911 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The null hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of 
the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the 
null of no autocorrelation. To save space, time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of 
endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
 
Property rights has an insignificantly negative consequence for MII in the 
case of prolonged- and non-prolonged users (and the non-programme 
countries), giving way to the argument that the supporting institutional 
framework needs to be strengthened to make the impact significant for MII. 
 
Moreover, model (8) where all institutional determinants have been taken 
together, are although in line with the overall analysis, but many 
determinants here, which have otherwise remained individually significant 
for reducing MII, become insignificant due to the overall weak institutional  
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Table 3.3(b). Dependent variable -real GDP- non-prolonged users 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 
1.002*** 1.006*** 1.003*** 1.014*** 0.982*** 1.027*** 0.925*** 1.010*** 
 
(0.00251) (0.00888) (0.00264) (0.00971) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0336) (0.00514) 
Log population 
0.00136 0.00446 0.00202 0.00406 0.00368 0.00251 -0.0159 0.00882 
 
(0.00179) (0.00313) (0.00209) (0.00345) (0.00838) (0.00664) (0.0100) (0.00793) 
Government Spending 
-2.63e-05 0.000569 0.000111 0.000347 -0.00117 0.000249 -0.000221 0.000131 
 
(0.000144) (0.000476) (0.000158) (0.000529) (0.00113) (0.000737) (0.000757) (0.000266) 
Predicted MII: Regime & Military 
-0.105*** 
       
 (0.0299) 
       
Predicted MII: Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.274*** 
      
 
 
(0.102) 
      
Predicted MII: Civil Liberties 
  
-0.0677* 
     
 
  
(0.0367) 
     
Predicted MII: KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.159* 
    
 
   
(0.0905) 
    
Predicted MII: Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.677** 
   
 
    
(0.295) 
   
Predicted MII: Investment Freedom 
     
-0.317* 
  
 
     
(0.173) 
  
Predicted MII: Property Rights 
      
-0.0480 
 
 
      
(0.143) 
 
Predicted MII: All Institutional Det. 
       
-0.0414 
 
       
(0.126) 
Constant 
0.000395 -0.0347 -0.0480 -0.121 0.444 -0.154 0.876** -0.190 
  
(0.0417) (0.128) (0.0516) (0.127) (0.312) (0.154) (0.407) (0.116) 
Observations 
883 725 957 958 961 961 961 665 
Number of countries 
70 77 75 77 77 77 77 69 
Hansen OIR test 
1 0.231 1 0.513 0.517 0.153 0.322 1 
AR(1) 
0.0430 0.0506 0.0439 0.0525 0.0458 0.0483 0.0563 0.103 
AR(2) 
0.0528 0.146 0.0439 0.0440 0.0153 0.0359 0.0515 0.205 
AR(3) 
0.202 0.309 0.182 0.181 0.220 0.169 0.186 0.361 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The null hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of 
the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the 
null of no autocorrelation. To save space, time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of 
endogenous variables are used as instruments.   
 
supporting environment. Hence, it is important that impact of institutional 
determinants is made stronger through enhanced focus on them and their 
supporting institutional environment. 
 
As can be seen in Tables 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) (and also Table A3.3), predicted 
MII in most of the cases impact negatively on real GDP; while in many 
cases the impact is significant, along with being negative. It can also be 
noted that while    , determined on the basis of a combined effect of all the 
institutional determinants, is significantly negative for real GDP in the case 
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of prolonged users, it also impacts real GDP negatively (though 
insignificantly) in the case of non-prolonged users (and non-programme 
countries).   
 
Summing up. Results of Tables 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) are in line with the 
premise laid out in [a], which indicates that institutional determinants have 
an overall significantly positive effect on real GDP, for both the prolonged 
and non-prolonged users. At the same time, support for the second premise 
(as indicated in [b]) that institutional determinants negatively impact MII  
can be seen in the estimations reflected in Tables 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), where 
most of the institutional determinants have a negative effect on MII, while 
in certain cases, the impact becomes significantly negative. Lastly, the third 
premise (as indicated in [c]) that the predicted MII (estimated from 
institutional determinants in Eq[2]) have a negative impact on real GDP, 
stands also supported by most of the estimations indicated by Tables 3.3(a) 
and 3.3(b). This, along with the fact that these institutional determinants, in 
the first place, are the ones that significantly impacted economic- and 
political institutional quality in programme countries during 1980-2009 (the 
same time period as of the current study)
55
.  
 
Overall it would pertinent to indicate therefore, that the missing link of 
institutions for reaching a positive economic growth consequence, does in 
fact exist in IMF programme countries. Hence, these significant 
institutional determinants need to be focused upon in future IMF 
programmes, since it can be seen that they positively affect real GDP both 
directly, and also indirectly through first negatively impacting MII, and 
then the predicted MII negatively affecting real GDP. Moreover, when the 
significant determinants of institutional quality for programme countries, 
were checked for their impact in the case of non-programme countries 
(during the same time period; see Tables A3.1, A.3.2, and A3.3), the 
estimated results here were also in line with the three premise (indicated in 
the theoretical framework).     
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 For details see chapter 2. 
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3.4.1. Robustness check 
 
Table 3.4 presents the estimated impact of MII on real GDP, indicating in 
turn that MII significantly and negatively impacts GDP and MII, in the case 
of both prolonged- and the non-prolonged users. This can be seen as a 
robustness check for estimations of real GDP and predicted MII (in Tables  
3.3(a) and 3.3(b)), where a negative relationship also exists in most of the 
cases. Moreover, Table 4 also indicates that MII significantly and 
negatively impacts real GDP in the case of non-programme countries, while 
the same relationship exists for the non-programme countries in most of the 
cases for predicted MII and real GDP (see Table A3.3). 
 
Table 3.4. Dependent variable -real GDP- prolonged and non-
prolonged users, and non-programme countries 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Prolonged Users Non-Prolonged Users Non-Programme Countries 
Lag Log Real GDP 1.000*** 0.714*** 0.992*** 
 
(0.00389) (0.0760) (0.00464) 
Log population -0.00467** -0.0715*** -0.000549 
 
(0.00185) (0.0274) (0.00107) 
Government Spending 0.000418** 8.22e-05 -0.000214 
 
(0.000208) (0.000179) (0.000196) 
MII -0.0856*** -0.0759*** -0.0890*** 
 
(0.0196) (0.0125) (0.0238) 
Constant 0.0644 3.423*** 0.202*** 
  (0.0400) (0.965) (0.0705) 
Observations 596 963 612 
Number of countries 44 77 51 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.000562 0.0175 0.00127 
AR(2) 0.103 0.0740 0.622 
AR(3) 0.998 0.123 0.476 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The null hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of 
the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the 
null of no autocorrelation. To save space, time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of 
endogenous variables are used as instruments.   
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The problem of a poor  performance of IMF programmes in terms of 
economic growth in recipient countries on one hand, and NIE literature's 
highlighting the important role institutions play in enhancing economic 
growth in many countries, on the other, created in turn a 'missing link' that 
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served as a motivation for the current study. The time duration of the study 
was 1980-2009, and the System-GMM approach was applied for carrying 
out the analysis. Subsequently, the estimated impact of institutional 
determinants (both political and economic) was found to be overall 
significant for enhancing real economic growth, both for prolonged- and 
non-prolonged users of IMF. At the same time, institutional determinants 
were also found to be overall significant in reducing macroeconomic 
instability. Moreover, predicted MII in turn also impacted negatively on 
real GDP. Hence, it has been pointed out that institutional determinants 
positively impacted real GDP both directly, as well as indirectly, through 
the channel of macroeconomic stability. The above estimations were carried 
out with institutional determinants, which in chapter 2 were found to be 
significant in the programme countries. As an extension, when these 
significant institutional determinants were checked in the case of non-
programme countries, similar estimated results were obtained, as in the case 
of programme countries. 
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Table A3.1. Dependent variable -real GDP- non-programme countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 0.976*** 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.969*** 0.938*** 0.951*** 0.944*** 0.987*** 
 
(0.00812) (0.0199) (0.00687) (0.00900) (0.0348) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.00379) 
Log Population 0.000704 -0.00137 -0.000686 -0.00275 -0.0651 0.00167 0.00202 0.000561 
 
(0.00243) (0.00292) (0.00151) (0.00250) (0.0428) (0.00550) (0.00518) (0.00120) 
Government Spending 0.000221 -0.000641 -0.000334 -4.49e-05 -1.50e-05 0.000251 0.000228 -0.000200 
 
(0.000189) (0.000564) (0.000279) (0.000202) (0.000200) (0.000210) (0.000216) (0.000138) 
Regime 0.0455*** 
      
0.0123 
 
(0.0145) 
      
(0.00961) 
Military -0.0206 
      
0.00160 
 
(0.0216) 
      
(0.0122) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
0.00130** 
     
0.000476 
  
(0.000523) 
     
(0.000419) 
Civil Liberties 
  
0.00507*** 
    
-0.00368 
   
(0.00194) 
    
(0.00250) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
0.00159*** 
   
-0.000310 
    
(0.000582) 
   
(0.000406) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
0.000253 
  
0.000293 
     
(0.000220) 
  
(0.000348) 
Investment Freedom 
     
0.000121 
 
4.91e-05 
      
(0.000293) 
 
(0.000155) 
Property Rights 
      
0.000801* -0.000171 
       
(0.000482) (0.000263) 
Constant 0.167* 0.126 0.188** 0.236*** 1.609** 0.420*** 0.539*** 0.140*** 
  (0.0900) (0.143) (0.0844) (0.0860) (0.650) (0.113) (0.107) (0.0323) 
Observations 606 465 610 611 610 610 613 457 
Number of countries 47 52 51 50 52 52 52 46 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(1) 0.00100 0.0154 0.000881 0.000959 0.00131 0.000863 0.00115 0.0216 
AR(2) 0.465 0.202 0.729 0.566 0.618 0.524 0.576 0.188 
AR(3) 0.465 0.0890 0.692 0.562 0.535 0.506 0.507 0.0784 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table A3.2. Dependent variable -Macroeconomic Instability Index- 
non-programme countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag MII 0.558*** 0.641*** 0.648*** 0.538*** 0.704*** 0.699*** 0.734*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0332) (0.125) (0.0328) (0.0299) (0.0669) (0.0707) (0.0607) (0.0950) 
Regime 0.0570 
      
0.358 
 (0.0424) 
      
(0.622) 
Military -0.0140 
      
-0.378 
 (0.0284) 
      
(1.478) 
Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.00484* 
     
-0.0134*** 
 
 
(0.00267) 
     
(0.00445) 
Civil Liberties 
  
0.00330 
    
-0.00505 
 
  
(0.00257) 
    
(0.0594) 
KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.000446 
   
-0.00383 
 
   
(0.000769) 
   
(0.0134) 
Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.000416 
  
0.00254 
 
    
(0.000992) 
  
(0.00222) 
Investment Freedom 
     
-0.00173* 
 
0.00332 
 
     
(0.00103) 
 
(0.00220) 
Property Rights 
      
-0.000596 -0.00116 
 
      
(0.00118) (0.00214) 
Constant 0.225*** 0.457*** 0.200*** 0.293*** 0.241*** 0.312*** 0.152** -0.500 
 (0.0274) (0.170) (0.0211) (0.0510) (0.0680) (0.0648) (0.0707) (1.726) 
Observations 1,316 596 1,418 1,382 635 635 637 474 
Number of countries 49 55 54 52 52 52 52 47 
Hansen OIR test 1.000 0.200 1.000 1.000 0.703 0.861 0.969 1.000 
AR(1) 7.45e-07 0.000712 3.07e-07 3.12e-07 6.07e-06 2.87e-06 7.63e-06 2.52e-05 
AR(2) 0.675 0.399 0.961 0.762 0.309 0.335 0.288 0.659 
AR(3) 
0.180 0.297 0.783 0.502 0.493 0.564 0.498 0.750 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models taken separately to see impact of variables individually (along with avoiding 
collinearity issue among variables); last model includes all the variables and checks their impact taken together. The null 
hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions 
(OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the null of no autocorrelation. To save space, 
time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table A3.3. Dependent variable -real GDP- non-programme countries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lag Log Real GDP 
0.944*** 0.976*** 0.989*** 0.985*** 0.983*** 0.988*** 0.982*** 1.029*** 
 
(0.0340) (0.00793) (0.00593) (0.00656) (0.00517) (0.00702) (0.0103) (0.0884) 
Log population 
-0.0603 -0.000369 -0.000547 -0.00115 -0.000736 -0.00356 -0.00316 -0.0658* 
 
(0.0412) (0.00160) (0.00112) (0.00136) (0.00134) (0.00462) (0.00528) (0.0392) 
Government Spending 
-8.42e-05 -0.000410 -0.000379 -0.000340 -0.000285 -0.000442 -0.000270 -0.000375 
 
(0.000202) (0.000342) (0.000252) (0.000245) (0.000220) (0.000284) (0.000244) (0.000382) 
Predicted MII: Regime & Military 
-0.0433** 
       
 (0.0220) 
       
Predicted MII: Agg. Gov. Ind. 
 
-0.126*** 
      
 
 
(0.0342) 
      
Predicted MII: Civil Liberties 
  
-0.0839*** 
     
 
  
(0.0270) 
     
Predicted MII: KOF Index of Glob. 
   
-0.113*** 
    
 
   
(0.0309) 
    
Predicted MII: Monetary Freedom 
    
-0.171** 
   
 
    
(0.0798) 
   
Predicted MII: Investment Freedom 
     
-0.163*** 
  
 
     
(0.0445) 
  
Predicted MII: Property Rights 
      
-0.0402 
 
 
      
(0.0479) 
 
Predicted MII: All Institutional Det. 
       
-0.281 
 
       
(0.297) 
Constant 
1.492** 0.307*** 0.180** 0.286*** 0.228*** 0.242* 0.265 2.023 
  
(0.675) (0.0926) (0.0744) (0.0966) (0.0827) (0.133) (0.166) (2.394) 
Observations 
605 464 608 610 609 609 611 457 
Number of countries 
47 51 50 50 51 51 51 46 
Hansen OIR test 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992 
AR(1) 
0.00104 0.0166 0.00101 0.000957 0.00105 0.000799 0.000890 0.0191 
AR(2) 
0.593 0.222 0.774 0.754 0.895 0.805 0.693 0.215 
AR(3) 
0.625 0.0990 0.732 0.718 0.583 0.767 0.668 0.0423 
Note: Models (indicated by columns) estimated by System-GMM approach; in the parenthesis are robust standard errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The null hypothesis of instrument set being valid exogenous is checked by the p-values of 
the Hansen Over-Identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Arellano-Bond AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are used to check the 
null of no autocorrelation. To save space, time dummies not reported. Furthermore, all available lagged values of 
endogenous variables are used as instruments. 
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Table A.3.4. Group-wise list of IMF member countries 
Non-Programme Countries 
Australia           
 
France 
 
Montenegro 
 
Spain 
 
Austria 
 
Germany 
 
Myanmar  
 
Suriname 
 
Bahamas 
 
Greece 
 
Namibia 
 
Swaziland 
 
Bahrain 
 
Iran, Islamic Republic of Netherlands 
 
Sweden 
 
Belgium 
 
Ireland 
 
New Zealand 
 
Switzerland 
 
Bhutan 
 
Italy 
 
Nigeria 
 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Botswana 
 
Japan 
 
Norway 
 
Timor-Leste 
 
Brunei Darussalam Kiribati 
 
Oman 
 
Tonga 
 
Canada 
 
Kuwait 
 
Palau 
 
Turkmenistan 
 
Colombia 
 
Libya 
 
Paraguay 
 
Tuvalu 
 
Cyprus 
 
Luxembourg 
 
Qatar 
 
United Arab Emirates 
Denmark 
 
Malaysia 
 
San Marino 
 
United Kingdom 
El Salvador 
 
Malta 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
United States 
 
Eritrea 
 
Marshall Islands Singapore 
 
Vanuatu 
 
Finland 
 
Micronesia, Federated States of South Sudan 
   
Programme Countries 
Non-Prolonged Users 
Afghanistan  
 
Djibouti  
 
Korea, Republic of 
 
Solomon Islands  
Angola 
 
Ecuador  
 
Kosovo  
 
Somalia  
 
Antigua and Barbuda  Egypt, Arab Republic of  Latvia  
 
Spain  
 
Azerbaijan, Republic of  Equatorial Guinea  Lebanon  
 
Sri Lanka  
 
Bangladesh  
 
Estonia, Republic of   
 
Lesotho  
 
St. Kitts and Nevis  
Barbados  
 
Ethiopia  
 
Liberia 
 
St. Lucia  
 
Belarus  
 
Fiji  
 
Lithuania, Republic of 
 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
Belize  
 
Gabon  
 
Maldives  
 
Syrian Arab Republic  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Gambia  
 
Mauritius 
 
Thailand 
 
Brazil  
 
Grenada  
 
Moldova  
 
Togo 
 
Cambodia  
 
Guatemala  
 
Morocco  
 
Trinidad and Tobago  
Cape Verde  
 
Guinea-Bissau  
 
Nepal  
 
Tunisia  
 
Central African Republic  Haiti  
 
Papua New Guinea  Ukraine  
 
Chile 
 
Hungary  
 
Peru  
 
Uruguay 
 
China  
 
Iceland  
 
Poland  
 
Uzbekistan  
 
Comoros  
 
India  
 
Portugal  
 
Venezuela, República Bolivariana de  
Congo, Democratic Republic of the  Indonesia  
 
Romania  
 
Vietnam  
 
Congo, Republic of  Iraq  
 
Samoa 
 
Yemen, Republic of  
Costa Rica  
 
Israel  
 
Serbia  
 
Zimbabwe  
 
Cyprus  
 
Jamaica  
 
Singapore  
   
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan, Republic of Slovak Republic           
  
Côte d'Ivoire 
 
Kenya  
 
Slovenia 
   
Prolonged Users 
Albania 
 
Dominica 
 
Madagascar  
 
Philippines 
 
Algeria 
 
Dominican Republic Malawi 
 
Russian Federation 
 
Argentina 
 
Georgia 
 
Mali 
 
Rwanda 
 
Armenia 
 
Ghana 
 
Mauritania 
 
Senegal 
 
Benin  
 
Guinea 
 
Mexico 
 
Serbia 
 
Bolivia 
 
Guyana 
 
Mongolia 
 
Sierra Leone 
 
Bulgaria 
 
Honduras 
 
Mozambique 
 
Tajikistan 
 
Burkina Faso 
 
Jordan 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Tanzania 
 
Burundi 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 
 
Niger 
 
Turkey 
 
Cameroon 
 
Lao People's Democratic Republic Pakistan 
 
Uganda 
 
Chad   Macedonia   Panama   Zambia   
Note: Countries are listed in alphabetical order. Also, the groups correspond to the time period of 1980-2009. 
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Chapter 4 
 
IMF programmes and institutional quality determinants: 
economic scenarios in Pakistan 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Pakistan has been a prolonged user
56
 of IMF resources since the late 1980s. 
From table 2.1 (in chapter 2), it could be seen that during 1980-2009, 
Pakistan was one of the 44 prolonged users; remaining under IMF 
programmes for half of those thirty years (where Mali and 
Senegal were at the top with twenty-three years each). Moreover, Pakistan 
remained a prolonged user during both the decades of 1990s and 2000s. 
Even after being a prolonged user it could not achieve sustained 
macroeconomic stabilization, while yearly economic growth on average 
since 1980s was substantially lower than that of the two decades before it 
(IEO, 2002, p. 119-121).  
 
Although, Article I, clause (v) of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund
57
 indicates that resources will be made 
available to members on a 'temporary' basis, it is ironic that since 1988 
Pakistan has entered more than twelve IMF programmes (and currently is in 
the 'Extended Fund Facility' IMF programme); while the programme 
completion rate has been abysmally low as only one of the programmes so 
far has been able to meet the macroeconomy related targets (Ahmad and 
Mohammad, 2012)! The fact that Pakistan has been able to get frequent 
IMF financial support underlines not only the recidivist behaviour but also 
raises questions about the IMF's criteria behind negotiating future 
programmes with recipient countries that had poor programme 
implementation record. Having said that this easy availability of money 
appears to have allowed successive governments to continuously postpone 
                                                          
 
56
 According to IEO (2002, p. 9 and p. 24) a country is considered to be a prolonged user 
if during a decade it remains for at least seven years in an IMF programme. 
57
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf 
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undertaking hard reforms, and this lack of political will to implement the 
reform agenda negotiated with the IMF, exists as one of the reasons behind 
the poor performance under the programmes, in terms of macroeconomic 
stability and economic growth.    
 
Notwithstanding the fact that many programmes went off-track in the early 
stages, the rigid, one-size-fits-all kind of programme conditionalities overly 
squeezed the demand side to meet certain macroeconomic targets, without 
being able to focus on the supply side enough to have positive 
consequences for economic growth. Moreover, the underlying neo-classical 
behavioural assumptions of the programme design saw a world of no 
transaction costs, and hence not much role of institutions. The fact that 
institutional environment could neither be focused upon or prioritized in the 
scope and sequencing of conditionalities, meant programme neglect 
towards enhancing the underlying political and economic institutional 
determinants like lack of appropriate level of governance, property rights 
protection, and freedoms that provide a conducive environment for 
economic activity and its regulation.  
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature, on the other hand, has 
pointed towards substantial empirical evidence in the last three decades or 
so, indicating that countries, which focused on improving determinants of 
institutional quality witnessed sustained macroeconomic stability and 
economic growth.  
 
Given this background, I intend to conduct counterfactual simulation 
analysis for Pakistan, which is a representative prolonged user, since it has 
been one of the most frequent users of IMF resources, and which has not 
been able to attain either sustained macroeconomic stability or positive 
consequences for economic growth. More specifically I will backcast the 
time series data of Pakistan by redesigning the IMF programme, in which, 
the traditional Fund approach is combined with the framework of NIE. I 
will look at: 'Had Fund’s programme been designed to focus on 
strengthening institutions then what would have been the impact on 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth of Pakistan?' This analysis, 
by redesigning the Fund’s policies through enhanced focus on 
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strengthening institutions, is expected to bring sustained positive long-term 
consequences for macroeconomic stability and economic growth.  
 
Outline of the study is as follows: literature will be reviewed in Section 4.2, 
data and methodology will be discussed in Section 4.3, followed by 
discussion of estimation and results in Section 4.4. The study will be 
concluded in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
IEO (2002, p. 119) pointed out that Pakistan's yearly economic growth was 
on average around 6-7 percent during the 1970s to the later part of 1980s, 
and the country was able to sustain its deficits in the fiscal and external 
sectors, without needing any major foreign assistance. This situation 
changed during late 1980s when economic growth started to deteriorate and 
inability to deal successfully with deficits led to build up of debt. Hence, 
the country entered successive IMF programmes in the years to follow, 
starting around the later part of 1980s.  
 
Looking back, the experience proved to be worse in terms of yearly 
economic growth during 1988-2000, which on average stood at around a 
little less than 4 percent, while at the same time major macroeconomic 
indicators, for example, inflation rate, foreign direct investment, export 
growth, and import cover in terms of foreign exchange reserves, all slacked 
when compared to the earlier two decades (IEO, 2002, p.119-121). Since 
2000, the situation has not changed much in terms of sustained 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth, although Pakistan continues 
to rely on IMF resources (with only an absence of few years during mid 
2000s). Weaknesses in the rigid IMF's financial programming framework, 
as shown by Killick (1995) and others, the limitations of the programme 
design to address the underlying institutional problems, along with easily 
available IMF finances, even at the back of low programme completion 
rates by Pakistan, could not allow the country to achieve sustained 
macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth.  
 
The importance of focusing on institutional determinants could be seen 
from the fact that once a governance variable was focused upon in 
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prolonged users, any difference in economic outlook between them and the 
non-prolonged (or temporary) users became insignificant (IEO, 2002, p. 
98). Yet institutional determinants were not focused upon as such in IMF 
programmes. Pakistan was no exception. Kemal (2003) pointed out that the 
(low) level of institutional quality deteriorated further since the early 1970s; 
with most deterioration happening in the 1990s. Greater institutional focus 
was all the more important since the quality of institutional determinants 
was quite on the lower side (when compared with other countries) as 
indicated by the ranking of Pakistan for many indicators of institutional 
quality (Khawaja and Khan, 2011, p. 810). 
  
IMF programmes, which are basically built on Polak model (Polak, 1957), 
primarily try to fix Balance of Payments imbalances (and indirectly the 
fiscal imbalance of the government) by targeting monetary aggregates. But 
here too critics, including Killick (1995, p. 133), indicate that by focusing 
too much on monetary aggregates targeting, programmes are more tilted on 
the quantitative aspects and do not pay much attention to the qualitative 
basis of the reform agenda. Internalizing this criticism, IMF did try to 
enhance the scope of programmes by including more supply side initiatives, 
but the inability of the Fund to move away from the neo-
classical/monetarist assumptions that have been shown by NIE literature to 
be quite out of sync with how the economies generally work (Groenewegen 
et al., 2010, p.13-24), has therefore not allowed IMF programmes to 
include much needed institutional focus and thus have not overall witnessed 
improved programme impacts.  
 
Pakistan's high programme incompletion rate may be due to the underlying 
behavioural assumptions of IMF programmes (as indicated above) that have 
served as a disincentive for recipient countries, especially the prolonged 
users/developing countries that would, otherwise, see themselves more 
aligned to a world as depicted by the assumptions of NIE. Another reason 
may be the easy availability of IMF resources at the back of incomplete 
programmes by recipient countries. Incompetent governments have seen 
this as an opportunity to either follow some initial programme 
conditionalities to get the first few financial installments from IMF, and 
then leave the programme, and then start another programme after a little 
while to repeat the same; all this to postpone doing the hard economic 
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reforms at the back of easily and frequently available IMF resources. This 
has worked as a moral hazard and have set in recidivist behaviour.  
 
IMF has assumed in its programmes a high level of policy implementation 
of the conditionalities. In the wake of overall weak institutional 
environment in programme countries, where the situation is much worse on 
average in the case of prolonged users, expecting a high implementation 
rate of programme conditionalities has been over-ambitious from IMF to 
say the least. This is because, in the case of prolonged users like Pakistan, 
in particular, such a high level of implementation has seen to be missing 
due to the weak institutional environment, resulting in poor implementation 
of programme conditionalities. For example, starting from the very 
monetary sector, programme design assumes a predictable and stable 
demand of money in the economy (Killick, 1995, p 132), but in a weak 
institutional environment of programme countries in general and prolonged 
users (like Pakistan) in particular, such assumptions are overly restrictive 
and unrealistic. Even forecasting the underlying variability in circulation in 
income velocity lacks much precision, and hence reduces programme 
objectivity/implementation record with relation to monetary aggregates 
targeting.  
 
The underlying neo-classical/monetarist basis of programme design falls 
short of understanding the domestic environment particularly of the 
prolonged users, which are mostly developing countries. One attribute is the 
opportunistic behaviour whereby satisfying self-interest does not always 
lead to overall welfare gain in the society, as otherwise alluded to in the 
metaphor of 'invisible hand' (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.15). In fact, the 
political and economic institutions collude to serve their own vested 
interests and therefore establish an 'extractive' institutional setup, which 
results in extraction of resources from the many to the group(s) that forms 
this collusion (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 74-82; Acemoglu, 2006; 
Acemoglu, 2008)
58
. The incentive system in such an institutional setup does 
not promote competition, but rather rewards behaviour that is loyal to 
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 'Inclusive economic institutions' on the other hand, work towards and facilitate 
participation of people in economic activity. Moreover, an inclusive/extractive economic 
institution results because of an inclusive/extractive political institutional setup 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 74-82; Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu, 2008). 
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sustaining this extractive institutional arrangement. This goes against the 
spirit of perfect competition, since the price signal that comes out of the 
market favours a certain lobby or individual, rather than being a natural 
outcome of true competition between buyers and sellers. These equilibrium 
market prices are sub-optimal and hence do not result in the optimal 
allocation of resources. In such a collusive institutional environment, 
markets no longer produce Pareto efficiency
59
, and as has been in the case 
of prolonged users like Pakistan, there are gross productive and allocative 
inefficiencies. In turn, it is hard to therefore see in developing countries like 
Pakistan much automatic clearing of markets and  contracts being enforced, 
without an active role of regulation (privately and through government), 
and existence of firms, in addition to markets; all as providing safeguards 
through governance structures that come about through institutions. Hence, 
IMF programmes need to move away to a NIE framework whose 
assumptions are cognizant of all these much probable possibilities, which 
are very much present in countries like Pakistan, and therefore underline the 
importance of institutions.  
 
Moreover, IMF programmes not only lack focus on allocative and 
productive efficiencies (aspects of static efficiency) but also on features 
pertaining to dynamic efficiency. Internalizing the concept of dynamic 
efficiency by IMF would entail enhancing the scope of its programmes to 
focus on innovation and the various linkages and elements that enable to 
reach it. This would mean coming up with programme  conditionalities that 
lower the risks that entrepreneurs face by focusing on the role of 
government, by improving the environment that ensures enforceability of 
contracts and effectively assigns and enforces property rights 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.16-17). 
 
IMF programmes also need to internalize that achieving static and dynamic 
efficiencies entail bearing transaction costs, and that they add to production 
costs, and overall impact economic growth of a country. In countries like 
Pakistan, where a lot of information asymmetries exist, and where weak 
governance, poor enforceability of contracts and property rights, has led to 
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 In such a situation, welfare of one person can only be increased by decreasing someone 
else's welfare (Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.16). 
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high level of transaction costs. In this regard, North (1994, p. 360) pointed 
out that institutions matter when doing transactions that entail high costs.  
 
In the case of extractive nature of institutions in Pakistan (Khawaja and 
Khan, 2011, p. 810), IMF programmes needs to enhance the scope to 
introduce conditionalities (mutually agreed between IMF and national 
authorities) that lower transaction costs in the case of firstly, market 
transactions that Commons (1931) referred to as 'bargaining transactions' 
between individuals that sell and buy at the market level. Secondly, the 
costs with regard to managerial transactions  between superiors and 
subordinates at the organizational level also need to be made optimal. 
Lastly, political transactions at the level of authorities are also brought into 
the scope of IMF programmes, so that property rights, taxes, and positive 
incentives are provided in such a way that the related transaction costs get 
rationalized and that distribution of national wealth gets done optimally. 
 
Libecap (1989) indicated that literature points out that the way property 
rights are allocated strongly determine the power distribution in the society. 
Allocation of property rights in a way that a group has great control results 
in the formulation of institutions that helps them gain immense power with 
the passage of time, raises a discussion to correct this unjustified initial 
distribution of property rights through an institutional reform effort 
(Groenewegen et al., 2010, p.130-31). In the case of Pakistan, inordinate 
distribution of land (mainly agricultural) among a select few locals was 
made by the British during the time of colonization, in return for this 
beneficiary group to offer services, which included, controlling local 
populations (that worked on these lands as peasants or labourers, and also 
influencing the nearby small land holders by putting weight on them by 
their sheer immense size of presence) from starting any rebellion against the 
colonizers. Hence, such a distribution of property rights allowed these 
groups to gain a lot of power and influence, since many people in the form 
of peasants and labourers generally, became reliant for their livelihoods on 
them, and also earning from the produce of land gave this group a 
significant material/financial edge compared to many others in the society. 
This initial distribution of property rights was artificially done, since the 
recipient of such property rights did not otherwise have any natural claim 
(in terms of inheritance or personal monetary means) to justify such a grant 
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of rights. This distribution put in place not only too much land in the hands 
of few individuals or families, which after the independence from British 
(resulting in the formation of Pakistan) were left with a lot of control and 
power in society to manipulate institutions so as to perpetuate their power 
ever further. In an independent Pakistan, these powerful political and 
economic elites colluded together to evolve political and economic 
institutions in an extractive way (transferring resources from the many (the 
masses) to the few (the elites)), and hence achieved greater perpetuation of 
their power and reaped larger material gains over time. Hussain (1999) and 
Khawaja and Khan (2009, p. 18) also pointed towards this extractive 
behaviour of elites in Pakistan.  
 
Therefore, IMF programmes not only need to focus on institutional 
determinants, but also need to help programme countries like Pakistan, 
move towards inclusive institutions. One of the ways for IMF to do this, is 
to base the programmes more on the framework of NIE, which does not 
leave most of interaction of agents in the economy on market forces alone, 
but rather acknowledges the importance of institutions at the back of the 
realization that agent's rationality is bounded, that opportunistic behaviour 
can exist to safeguard vested interests, that transaction costs exists, that 
there is a need to enforce contracts (more so in an ever increasing 
environment of impersonal exchange) and that an environment is needed 
for optimal allocation and adequate safeguard of property rights.     
 
IMF programmes by basing its programmes on neo-classical/monetarist 
behavioural assumptions, have basically seen macroeconomic issues, 
mainly the BOP imbalance, as a consequence of not properly targeting of 
monetary aggregates by the recipient country. In this sense, it limited its 
scope by mainly to focusing on the demand side of the economy, while 
putting less emphasis on the institutional determinants (on the supply side), 
which have been shown in literature to play an equally important role in 
positively impacting macroeconomic stability and economic growth (Khan 
and Knight, 1985; Acemoglu et al., 2003). NIE framework underlines the 
importance of focusing on institutional determinants as they are important 
for improving income per capita (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Afonso 
and Jalles, 2011). Therefore, it seems appropriate for IMF programmes to 
constructively address criticism on programme design by adopting NIE 
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framework. In doing so, it is hoped the importance institutional 
determinants play for macroeconomic stability and economic growth will 
be realized. 
 
4.3. Data and Methodology 
 
4.3.1. Theoretical design 
 
The presence of powerful elites (both politicians and economic elites) take 
advantage of the overall weak institutional setup and in turn are able to 
overcome checks placed through macroeconomic policies in one way or the 
other. In doing so they are able to extract resources and in turn become a  
source of macroeconomic instability, while traditional macroeconomic 
variables are only symptoms of the deeper institutional problem (Acemoglu 
et al., 2003). At the same time, weak institutional setup may also lead to 
coups, as was seen on many occasions in Pakistan (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2001).  
 
IMF programmes based on traditional neo-classical/monetarist assumptions 
have not put attention to institutional determinants that can check this 
opportunistic behaviour. Such a weak institutional has allowed political and 
economic elites in prolonged users like Pakistan to take advantage of the 
weak institutional environment and extract resources (Hussain, 1999; 
Khawaja and Khan, 2009, p. 18). Moreover the over-emphasis of the 
programmes on traditional macroeconomic variables mostly, and not much 
on the institutional determinants, have not strengthened the needed 
institutional environment in which macroeconomic variables can effectively 
impact macroeconomic consequences. At the same time, inadequate 
institutional setup does not boost supply side factors, including business 
and investment environment that negatively impacts economic growth. 
Also, Haghighi et al. (2012), in a case study conducted on Iran, pointed out 
that there existed a long-term relation between economic growth and 
macroeconomic instability, and from chapter 3 it could be seen that a 
increase in macroeconomic instability negatively impacts economic growth. 
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Given this background, in the current study, it is proposed that 
improvement in KOF Index of Globalization will result in a positive impact 
on macroeconomic instability and real economic growth. An additional 
proposition will be that increase in macroeconomic instability will also 
reduce real economic growth. The underlying proposition will be that 
macroeconomic instability will depend on institutional environment as well 
(and not just macroeconomic variables), since it will also be reduced by the 
improvement in determinants of institutional quality (in the current case 
being KOF Index of Globalization). 
 
Based on the relationship between institutions, macroeconomic instability 
and economic growth, established in the last chapter, this chapter aims at 
estimating the effect of improvement in institutional quality on 
macroeconomic instability and economic growth. More specifically, 
counterfactual analysis will be done to estimate the effects of indicators of 
institutional quality on the index of macroeconomic instability and on the 
average growth rate of GDP of Pakistan. For the analysis, however, 
continuous data are required; therefore we have focused only on KOF Index 
of Globalization as indicators of institutional quality. The following 
discussion, therefore, focuses on the theoretical linkages of globalization on 
the sub-indices of macroeconomic instability and hence on economic 
growth. 
 
The first sub index of macroeconomic instability is the inflation rate. 
Inflation rate escalates instability through its effect on economic decisions 
regarding money demand, savings, and investment, which in turn harm 
economic growth. KOF Index of Globalization is an indicator of 
globalization. The economic dimension of globalization affects inflation 
rate through trade which is the main cause of purchasing power parity. Less 
restricted trade not only controls average inflation rate, it also minimize 
variability of the inflation rate. 
 
Globalization has two competing effects on exchange rate variability. On 
the one hand globalization makes the country more vulnerable to foreign 
shocks, thereby making exchange rate more volatile. On the other hand, 
more globalized economy can potentially earn more foreign exchange, 
accumulation of which saves domestic currency from speculative attacks. 
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So exchange rate remains stable. Furthermore, both stable prices and 
exchange rate stability lead to stable real effective exchange rate. 
 
The fundamental requirement of achieving higher growth rate is the 
enabling environment in which economic decisions are taken. If there is 
uncertainty regarding future inflation rate or exchange rate, then businesses 
cannot take optimal decisions regarding investment, saving and 
international trade. The sub-optimality of economic decisions discourages 
improvement in living standard of the citizens. Therefore, reducing 
macroeconomic instability is of utmost importance for achieving higher 
growth rate. 
 
4.3.2. Sample 
 
Time series data on Pakistan is taken for the duration 1980-2014 (since, 
during this time, Pakistan frequently used IMF resources). The data has 
been enhanced from 2009 (in the rest of thesis) to 2014, to avoid the 
degrees of freedom issue while applying the VAR (Vector Autoregression) 
approach. 
 
4.3.3. Data and variable description  
 
From chapter 2, significant determinants of political- and economic 
institutional quality were estimated for IMF programme countries. In order 
to carry out Structural VAR (SVAR) analysis it is important to have 
variables that are neither qualitative, along with covering adequate time 
duration (for avoiding degrees of freedom issue). KOF index of 
globalization (or simply, 'KOF') has therefore been taken and its impact is 
being seen on MII and real economic growth.  
 
Data on real GDP (RGDP) is taken from the World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) of the IMF
60
. 
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 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/download.aspx 
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Based on the methodology and definitions of Ismihan (2003), 
Macroeconomic Instability Index (MII)
61
 has been constructed using the 
following five
62
 indicators: 
 
(i) Inflation rate (INF; calculated by taking data on average consumer prices 
from WEO
63
), 
 
(ii) Fiscal deficit (FD) as percentage of GDP
64
.  
 
(iii) Public debt (PD; domestic debt plus external debt and liabilities) as 
percentage of GDP
65
.  
 
(iv) exchange rate variability (ERV) has been calculated on the basis of 12 
month end-of-period nominal exchange rate in SDR, taken from 
International Finance Statistics (IFS; IMF)
66
 and, 
 
(v) Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (REER; taken from WDI
67
 of the 
World Bank). This indicator has been included in Ismihan (2003) to 
augment MII to include the impact of competitiveness in it. Furthermore, it 
needs to be indicated that there exists another index in this regard called the 
Macroeconomic Stability Subindex
68
, produced by World Economic 
Forum. The reason it has not been employed in the current analysis is 
because of lack of consistency of its methodology; in turn, inhibiting 
comparability of data over longer periods of time. 
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 For details, see Ismihan (2003; pp. 214-15), who constructed MII. 
62
 It may be indicated here that while Ismihan (2003) only included the first four 
indicators to construct the MII, the current study augments it with one more indicator. 
63
 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/download.aspx 
64
 Data source is State Bank of Pakistan (http://www.sbp.org.pk/) and Ministry of 
Finance, Government of Pakistan (http://finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html). Also, data on 
fiscal deficit is taken instead of budget deficit due to availability of data in this format for 
Pakistan. 
65
 Data source is State Bank of Pakistan (http://www.sbp.org.pk/). 
66
 Data taken from IFS CD ROM (IMF). 
67
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicator 
68
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_Reports/Reports/GCR_05_06/C
omposition_of_the_Growth_Competitiveness_Index 
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4.3.4. Econometric methodology 
 
The prime objective of this chapter is to conduct counterfactual analysis for 
the effect of institutional quality on macroeconomic instability and 
economic growth. For this purpose we have constructed a VAR (Vector 
Autoregression) using all sub-indices of MII and indices of institutional 
quality – KOF index of globalization.  
 
Thereafter, appropriate restrictions are imposed on contemporaneous 
relationship of variables to make VAR identified and to recover structural 
shocks. These shocks are then used to trace out the effect of KOF on sub-
indices of MII, and real economic growth, respectively.  
 
In the next step, counterfactual simulations are conducted, assuming a 
hypothetical situation in which IMF programme has an institutional focus. 
More specifically, the following three scenarios are assumed, with respect 
to improvement in institutional quality and their effect will be simulated on 
MII and log of real GDP, respectively: 
 
a) low scenario: institutional determinants are enhanced by 5 percent; 
b) moderate scenario: institutional determinants are enhanced by 10 
percent; and 
c) optimistic scenario: institutional determinants are enhanced by 15 
percent. 
 
The reason for taking these particular values is to see how enhancement in 
institutional quality in small steps impact MII and real economic growth.  
 
This procedure gives us one-time simulated figures. However, to be 
confident we have also done stochastic simulation in which the procedure, 
of finding counterfactual MII and economic growth rate, is repeated for ten 
thousand times using bootstrap procedure, and then the characteristics of 
distribution of MII and real economic growth in each scenario is presented 
and explained below.  
 
The impact of MII is also seen on real economic growth. Hence, the impact 
of institutional determinants is seen both directly on MII and real economic 
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growth, and also on real economic growth indirectly by seeing how a 
reduction in MII impacts real economic growth. 
 
The Structural VAR Approach. VAR has been employed by numerous 
researchers since Sims (1980), as an alternative to the traditional 
simultaneous equations systems in which the difference between 
endogenous and exogenous variables is not only difficult to find, but also 
looking for appropriate instruments is virtually impossible. Moreover, 
interdependence among variables is analyzed through impulse response 
functions. However, some restrictions need to be put on structural 
parameters, and structural shocks need to be recovered before estimating 
impulse response functions. 
 
There are three types of restrictions imposed on structural parameters, 
namely the Choleski decomposition approach, Sims-Bernanke approach, 
and Blanchard and Quah approach. For example, in Choleski 
decomposition method, the ordering of the variables is done so that the 
matrix of structural parameters is a lower triangular and residuals are 
orthogonalized across equations (Leamer,1985; Cooley and LeRoy, 1985). 
At the same time, instead of relying on identifying structural parameters in 
triangular fashion, Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986) highlighted the role of 
economic theory in identifying structural shocks. In this regard, the 
restrictions may not however be on contemporaneous relationships among 
variables, and identifying restrictions may render the system over-
identified. Finally, Blanchard and Quah (1989) proposed identification 
strategy through economic theory by imposing long run restrictions of one 
variable on the other. 
 
Whether or not variables in the VAR should be differenced, when they are 
non-stationary, is a long debated issue. In this regard, according to Sims et 
al. (1990) transforming VAR, if variables are non-stationary, into 
stationary cointegrated system is not necessary. But some 
econometricians like Garratt et al. (1998) warn against making variables 
stationary if they contain unit root. However, if there exists long run 
equilibrium relationship among variables, VAR in level can be used, 
even if variables in the system are non-stationary (Sims et al., 1990; 
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Sims, 1992). The essential requirement however, is that residuals from 
VAR model should be free from autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
 
In the light of the discussion above, it appears pertinent to lay down below 
some of the technical details of the VAR model used in the current study. 
  
Suppose the following dynamic structural equations explain the dynamics 
of an economy
69
.  
 
          
  
           
  
              [4.1]  
 
Here,   is the matrix of structural parameters representing 
contemporaneous response coefficients,    is a vector of variables, 
containing indices of macroeconomic instability index, and indicators of 
institutional quality. Where,    is a vector of constants,   
  represents 
matrices of endogenous variables, while   
  represent coefficient matrices of 
exogenous variables. Moreover,    represents vector of structural 
innovations, which are IID (independently and identically distributed).  
 
There are six variables in the VAR model: inflation rate (INF), exchange 
rate (ER)
70
, real effective exchange rate (REER), public debt (PD) and 
fiscal deficit (FD). Here, both PD and FD are taken as ratios of GDP, while 
KOF index of globalization has been taken as a determinant of institutional 
quality. Pre-multiplying above equation by     on both sides to convert the 
system into VAR in standard form or reduced form VAR.  
 
         
  
           
  
              [4.2]  
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 From chapter 3, it can be seen that in IMF programme countries, determinants of 
institutional quality have an overall negative impact on MII. Moreover, Acemoglu et al. 
(2003) pointed out that the main reason behind macroeconomic instability and the 
varying levels of macroeconomic volatility among different countries were related more 
with institutional reasons than the traditionally identified macroeconomic determinants. 
Similarly, better budgetary institutions (which are important economic institutions) had a 
negatively significant impact on (budget) deficit (von Hagen, 1991). Note: for details on 
VAR and Structural VARs, see chapter 5, 'Multiequation time-series models' of Walter 
Enders (2015).  
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 I have employed ER in VAR model, but simulation analysis is based on ERV. 
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where, 
 
    
             [4.3] 
     
           [4.4] 
     
           [4.5] 
    
                       [4.6] 
 
It is important to note that reduced form residuals are related with the 
underlying structural shocks according to the final equation: 
 
     
 
      
       
     
        [4.7] 
                    
A critical step in VAR analysis is selection of appropriate lag length, which 
is helpful in capturing true dynamics of the economy and in finding reliable 
results. Wrong specification of lag length results in unreliable estimates 
(Braun and Mittnik, 1993). More lags quickly consume degrees of freedom 
while selecting too few lags result in autocorrelated residuals (Lutkepohl, 
1991). Moreover, as Hafer and Sheehan (1991) highlighted, forecast 
accuracy also depends on lag length. Two criteria that are frequently used in 
research studies are AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and SC (Schwarz 
Information Criterion. The idea behind these criteria is that more lags 
reduce residual sum of squares (RSS), but consume more degrees of 
freedom. Both criteria compare benefit of reduction in RSS with the loss of 
degrees of freedom. If adding an additional lag reduces RSS more than the 
loss of loss of degrees of freedom, then that lag must be included in the 
VAR. The best model is where the value of either of these criteria is 
minimum.  
 
After estimation of VAR in standard form, a researcher is required to put 
restrictions on coefficients to recover structural parameters from estimated 
reduced form residuals. There are           number of restrictions that 
need to be imposed to have an exactly identified system.  
 
The VAR model in Eq. [4.1] has moving average representation, which can 
be found by recursive substitution method. The vector moving average 
form is given as: 
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                      [4.8]             
 
where, 
 
           
                            [4.9]     
 
or 
 
                               [4.10] 
 
Where, 
 
         
                      [4.11] 
 
Structural shocks can be recovered from Eq. [4.1] by using structural 
parameters, after restricting some of the parameters. 
 
I have put the restriction that institutional quality is causally prior to all 
other variables in the VAR. This assumption is justified as institutional 
quality affects macroeconomic variables, but the contemporaneous 
relationship is not true for the other way round. Within the sub-indices of 
macroeconomic instability index, exchange rate is assumed to be 
immediately affected by all variables, while fiscal indicators and inflation 
rate are adjusted in the last. Overall these assumptions are consistent with 
exchange rate overshooting model (Dornbusch, 1976), fiscal theory of 
exchange rate (Oge Guney, 2007) and the assumption of price rigidity in the 
economy.  
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4.4. Estimation and Results
71
 
 
4.4.1. VAR and impulse response functions of sub-Indices of 
Macroeconomic Instability Index and KOF Index of Globalization 
 
In the first step, pretesting of unit root in the variables is important. I have 
used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure to test the presence of 
unit root. As expected, most of the variables are found to be unit root 
processes, as shown in table 4.1. Inflation rate and exchange rate variability 
are only stationary at level; the reason being that both variables are first 
differences of non-stationary variables, namely the inflation rate and 
exchange rate, respectively. However, none of the variables contain two 
unit roots so that all variables are stationary at first difference.  
 
Table 4.1: Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
                               Level First Difference 
Variables ADF Critical Values Probability ADF Critical Values Probability 
ER 2.968524 -3.699871 0.9999 -3.263094 -3.689194 0.0267 
ERV -5.692251 -3.639407 0.0000     
 
FD -2.490783 -3.639407 0.1265 -7.795269 -3.646342 0.0000 
INF -3.210213 -3.646342 0.0283     
 
KOF -0.802918 -3.639407 0.8055 -5.694326 -3.646326 0.0000 
LRGDP -2.853124 -3.646342 0.0619 -3.665772 -3.653730 0.0097 
MII -2.460716 -3.646342 0.1339 -8.503539 -3.653730 0.0000 
PD -2.756072 -3.646342 0.0757 -4.700672 -3.646342 0.0006 
REER -2.000458 -3.639407 0.2853 -5.624953 -3.646342 0.0000 
 
When variables are non-stationary at level then they have long run trend or 
permanent component. In this case if variables are cointegrated then the 
system of equations should be modeled as vector error correction model 
(VECM), otherwise these variables VAR in first difference. The procedure, 
therefore, is to test the hypothesis of cointegration among the variables. I 
have employed Johansen’s methodology to test cointegration among 
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 Here, EViews 8 has been employed for estimation purposes 
(http://www.eviews.com/EViews8/ev8whatsnew.html). 
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variables that are to be combined in VAR model. In table 4.2, both the 
Trace test and Maximum Eigenvalue statistic show that there are six 
eigenvalues that are nonzero; this indicates that system as a whole is 
stationary. So it is not appropriate to model variables in VECM. I, 
therefore, employed VAR instead of VECM. The reason for not 
differencing the data is to avoid loss of important information contained in 
the variables (more detail is given in econometric methodology section).  
 
In the next step six variables reduced form VAR has been estimated by 
OLS and using data in level form. Most of the variables in the model are 
supposed to be highly persistent, but as discussed in the methodology 
section, that VAR in level form can be used even if variables are unit root 
processes. The AIC is minimum at three lags, while SIC is minimum at first 
lag of the VAR. The likelihood ratio test also recommends one lag. So only 
one lag is included in the VAR model. (See Table A4.1 for details). 
 
Table 4.2: Results of Johansen Cointegration Test  
Series: ER FD INF KOF PD REER      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)** 
Eigenvalue Trace Statistic 
0.05 Critical Value Prob. 
None *  0.910570  210.2054  103.8473  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.754857  135.3621  76.97277  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.677771  91.77874  54.07904  0.0000 
At most 3 *  0.577992  56.67147  35.19275  0.0001 
At most 4 *  0.424355  29.92679  20.26184  0.0017 
At most 5 *  0.338414  12.80659  9.164546  0.0098 
* indicates 1% level of significance. 
** Cointegrating Equations (CE(s)).  
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized No. of 
CE(s)** 
Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None *  0.910570  74.84337  40.95680  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.754857  43.58334  34.80587  0.0035 
At most 2 *  0.677771  35.10727  28.58808  0.0063 
At most 3 *  0.577992  26.74468  22.29962  0.0112 
At most 4 *  0.424355  17.12020  15.89210  0.0320 
At most 5 *  0.338414  12.80659  9.164546  0.0098 
* indicates 1% level of significance. 
** Cointegrating Equations (CE(s)). 
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Figure 4.1 VAR Simulations of KOF Index of Globalization on 
components of MII 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of KOF to KOF
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of INF to KOF
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of PD to KOF
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of FD to KOF
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of REER to KOF
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of ER to KOF
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 Note: Blue line indicates impulse response function, while the two red lines are representative of +/- 2 
standard error or 95% confidence interval. 
 
Some diagnostic tests have been used to analyze behaviour of the residual 
series. The multivariate LM test is used and results (in Table A4.2) show 
that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals. This shows we have chosen 
the appropriate number of lags. Moreover, the residuals are found to be 
identically distributed, as shown from results of multivariate White test for 
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heteroskedasticity
72
 (see Table A4.3). This indicates that our variables do 
not follow multivariate ARCH process, therefore, VAR model is 
appropriate for our analysis. Results of reduced form VAR are given in 
Table A4.4. Moreover, the above stated restrictions are imposed to recover 
structural shocks (results of structural parameters are given in Table A4.5). 
However, we have presented only impulse response functions here which 
show relationship among variables of the system.  
 
The impulse response of KOF index of globalization (abbreviated as KOF) 
on itself highlights the presence of path dependence, and the persistence of 
the series. It is shown in figure 4.1 that the positive shock in KOF remains 
persistent for around 7 years. The series of KOF has long memory as the 
lagged effect remains significant for about 7 years.   
 
In the case of inflation, the one standard deviation (SD) positive shock of 
KOF reduces inflation rate immediately. The impulse response further 
indicates that the shock impacts with a time lag of around one year. This 
effect reaches its peak (trough in the figure) in second year after the shock 
and the effect remains significant for two years after the shock. Although 
the negative effect remains there till seventh year but it becomes 
insignificant in fourth year. Similarly, the positive shock of KOF, 
negatively impacts fiscal deficit, with a time lag of around one year. The 
impulse response indicates that the impact is most profound for two to five 
years after shock and it becomes insignificant after six years. The impact of 
increase in KOF index on public debt is positive but it is statistically 
insignificant. The reason for this result is that KOF has effect on debt only 
through fiscal deficit. Hence, the effect of KOF on debt is insignificant after 
controlling for the effect of KOF index on fiscal deficit. Similarly, the 
impact on real effective exchange rate  and nominal exchange rate is found 
to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Despite insignificant effect of KOF index on some of the sub-indices of 
MII, further analysis has been conducted on all sub-indices of MII. It may 
be the case that individual effect of variables is insignificant but their joint 
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 See White (1980) for details. 
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effect is significant. Therefore, we have estimated another VAR system in 
which effect of KOF on overall MII has been traced out.  
4.4.2. VAR and impulse response functions of Macroeconomic Instability 
Index, real GDP and KOF Index of Globalization  
 
For counterfactual simulation of growth rate of real GDP we have estimated 
three variables VAR comprising of log values of real GDP, MII and KOF 
index of globalization. The objective is to capture the direct and indirect 
relationship between KOF index and GDP. Results in figure 4.2 indicate 
that KOF index has persistent effect on itself and the effect dies out after 
five years. Interestingly, KOF index positively responds to GDP but MII 
does not affect institutional quality. Actually, log values of real GDP reflect 
both long term growth and short term deviations from trend path, whereas 
MII indicates only short term instability. Institutions are developed over the 
long run; that’s why long run growth in GDP has significant effect on 
institutional quality. 
 
Figure 4.2 Impulse response functions 
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  KOF to KOF
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  KOF to MII
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  KOF to LRGDP
-.050
-.025
.000
.025
.050
.075
.100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  MII to KOF
-.050
-.025
.000
.025
.050
.075
.100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  MII to MII
-.050
-.025
.000
.025
.050
.075
.100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  MII to LRGDP
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LRGDP to KOF
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LRGDP to MII
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of  LRGDP to LRGDP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
Note: Blue line indicates impulse response function, while the two red lines are representative of +/- 2 
standard error or 95% confidence interval. 
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The MII negatively responds to KOF index; the effect is at its peak after 
one year but it gradually dies out to zero after five years. This result is 
consistent with that of the last section which indicates its robustness. The 
effect of MII on itself is positive but it has less inertia in that the effect is 
significant only for one year after the shock. The real GDP does not affect 
MII as the latter is only short run phenomenon, whereas the former is 
predominantly determined by the long run fundamentals. 
 
Finally and more interestingly the direct effect of KOF index on GDP is 
found to be insignificant but MII does affect GDP even in the long run. 
This result validates our main hypothesis that institutional quality dampens 
macroeconomic instability, which provides enabling environment for 
achieving higher growth rate of real GDP. Moreover, this result justifies our 
suggestion that IMF can play an important role in the short term 
stabilization, as well as in the long run growth by making its 
loan/programme conditional on institutional quality. 
 
4.4.3 Simulations 
 
Counterfactual simulation results. As mentioned above the traditional 
approach of IMF focuses on stabilization and not on institutions. However, 
as found in second paper of this thesis, institutional quality has significant 
effect on macroeconomic instability, which in turn affects economic 
growth. This chapter, therefore, deals with counterfactual analysis by 
developing a hypothetical case in which IMF imposes conditionality of 
improving institutional quality (KOF index here) by a certain percentage 
and then the effects of this intervention, on macroeconomic variables, are 
estimated. Through these variables MII is constructed and average value of 
MII and its variance are compared with that of the actual data. The 
intervention is effective if it reduces MII compared to what has been found 
in actual data. The same is done for growth rate of real GDP. 
 
Historical simulations. The economic system is assumed as described by 
VAR in the last section. In the simulation analysis data on all sub-indices of 
MII are supposed to be generated through estimated VAR and estimated 
shocks. However, for counterfactual analysis hypothetical cases are 
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assumed in which IMF imposes conditions to improve the index of KOF. 
For this three scenarios are assumed with respect to improvement in KOF 
index; low scenario corresponds to 5% improvement in KOF index, 
moderate scenario corresponds to 10% improvement, while high scenario 
corresponds to 15% improvement in KOF index. Results are given in table 
4.3. 
 
Results are in conformity with the hypothesis that intervention through 
institutional arrangement will reduce macroeconomic instability and 
increase GDP growth rate. In all the three hypothetical scenarios average 
value of MII is less than that found in actual data. And this effect increases 
with increase in the improvement in KOF index. The standard deviation 
also decreases with increase in KOF index but the relationship is opposite 
for 15% increase in KOF. The GDP growth rate also increases as 
institutional quality improves and the gain is quite significant. It may be 
pointed that the economy of Pakistan, on average, grew by 5% over the last 
five decades
73
. However, our results show that, this average growth rate 
could have been increased to above 5% by improving institutional quality. 
The IMF programs intend to stabilize the economy in the short run, which 
positively contributes to high growth in the long run. Our results show that 
this objective can be better achieved through intervention regarding 
institutional quality.  
 
Table 4.3. Comparison of actual and historically simulated figures 
  MII Real GDP 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Growth Rate 
Actual 0.4425 0.1066 4.63 
Low Scenario 0.4146 0.1030 5.08 
Moderate Scenario 0.3952 0.1026 5.37 
High Scenario 0.3836 0.1043 5.57 
 
Stochastic Simulations. Although results of historical simulations are 
according to our hypothesis but these results are less reliable as these are 
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 Calculation on the basis of various issues of Pakistan's Economic Survey 
(http://www.finance.gov.pk/). 
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based on only one time simulations in which historically observed shocks 
are assumed to be the only shocks that can disturb the system. However, 
shocks series follow random process and need not remain same in the 
future. Had we observed a different shock series, different simulation 
results would have been achieved. To check the robustness of the results we 
have conducted stochastic simulation analysis in which 10,000 different 
scenarios are built with respect to shocks to each of the series in the VAR 
model. As the actual probability density function of structural shocks is 
unknown, therefore, we have used bootstrap procedure to find reliability of 
our estimates. In 10,000 repetitions, average values of the parameters, along 
with the values of probability are indicated in table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4. Comparison of actual and stochastically simulated figures 
  MII Real GDP 
  Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Growth Rate 
Actual 0.443  0.107  0.046  
Low Scenario 0.436  0.103  0.050  
P-value (0.600)   (0.700) 
Moderate Scenario  0.427  0.106  0.051  
P-value (0.680)   (0.790) 
High Scenario 0.416  0.109  0.053  
P-value (0.720)   (0.890) 
 
Results of stochastic simulation are broadly in conformity with those found 
in historical simulations. Average value and standard deviation of MII 
decrease and real GDP growth rate increases as we increase the KOF index 
value. However, the difference between actual and average value of MII is 
smaller compared to that in the case of historical simulation. But in case of 
growth rate results remain almost same. We also find the probability that 
increased KOF index by 5% will result in lower value of MII than the 
actual value is 0.60, and the probability of growth rate being higher than the 
actual one is 0.70. The corresponding probabilities for 10% increase in 
KOF index are 0.68 and 0.79, and for 15% increase are 0.72 and 0.89, 
respectively. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to estimate the effect of improvement in a 
significant determinant of institutional quality, on macroeconomic 
instability and economic growth, in the case of a prolonged user of IMF 
resources, Pakistan. For this purpose, VAR model has been estimated and 
counterfactual analysis has been done in both historical as well as stochastic 
simulation using bootstrap procedure. Results indicate that macroeconomic 
instability can be reduced and hence higher growth rate of GDP can be 
achieved through intervention regarding institutional quality. The IMF, 
therefore, can achieve its objectives of stabilization and economic growth 
by making its programmes dependent on institutional quality of the 
program country. 
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Table A4.1. VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
 
 
 
Table A4.2. VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Sample: 1980 2014 
Included observations: 33 
Lags LM-Stat Probability 
1  38.88366  0.3411 
Note: Probabilities from chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
 
Table A.4.3 VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests  
Cross Terms (only levels and squares) 
Sample: 1980 2014 
Included observations: 33 
   Joint test: 
 Chi-sq Degrees of Freedom Probability 
 276.4619 252  0.1388 
 
  
Endogenous variables: KOF INF PD FD REER ER  
Exogenous variables: C  
 Sample: 1980 2014 
 Included observations: 31 
  Lag LR AIC SC 
0 NA   38.47708  38.75462 
1   280.0967*  29.12896   31.07178* 
2  36.78682  29.40783  33.01593 
3  48.89836   27.65555*  32.92892 
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Table A4.4. Reduced form VAR estimates 
  KOF INF PD FD REER ER 
KOF(-1)  0.832827 -0.344534  0.410864 -0.196542 -0.729452  1.370356 
 
 (0.10673)  (0.25628)  (0.31951)  (0.11007)  (0.62944)  (0.56841) 
 
[ 7.80299] [-1.34437] [ 1.28592] [-1.78554] [-1.15889] [ 2.41086] 
INF(-1)  0.083740  0.161666  0.058166  0.000356  0.337445  0.171875 
 
 (0.06893)  (0.16552)  (0.20635)  (0.07109)  (0.40652)  (0.36711) 
 
[ 1.21481] [ 0.97672] [ 0.28187] [ 0.00501] [ 0.83008] [ 0.46819] 
PD(-1)  0.051135 -0.288177  0.909026 -0.073867  0.043610 -0.424193 
 
 (0.03983)  (0.09564)  (0.11924)  (0.04108)  (0.23491)  (0.21213) 
 
[ 1.28375] [-3.01305] [ 7.62349] [-1.79815] [ 0.18565] [-1.99969] 
FD(-1) -0.232726  0.064702  1.470691  0.370875 -1.542596  1.465871 
 
 (0.19138)  (0.45953)  (0.57291)  (0.19737)  (1.12864)  (1.01921) 
 
[-1.21604] [ 0.14080] [ 2.56706] [ 1.87905] [-1.36677] [ 1.43824] 
REER(-1) -0.016746 -0.127285  0.061975 -0.027921  0.846542 -0.03486 
 
 (0.01507)  (0.03619)  (0.04512)  (0.01554)  (0.08888)  (0.08027) 
 
[-1.11105] [-3.51712] [ 1.37361] [-1.79629] [ 9.52403] [-0.43430] 
ER(-1)  0.011252  0.009456 -0.046351  0.011600  0.128253  0.735696 
 
 (0.01655)  (0.03975)  (0.04956)  (0.01707)  (0.09763)  (0.08816) 
 
[ 0.67971] [ 0.23789] [-0.93529] [ 0.67941] [ 1.31367] [ 8.34467] 
C  6.296581  53.82670 -24.42592  19.19467  40.40490 -12.82334 
 
 (6.93364)  (16.6488)  (20.7563)  (7.15078)  (40.8904)  (36.9258) 
 
[ 0.90812] [ 3.23307] [-1.17679] [ 2.68428] [ 0.98813] [-0.34727] 
 R-squared  0.988513  0.547322  0.883402  0.630514  0.971136  0.986238 
 Adj. R-squared  0.985862  0.442857  0.856495  0.545248  0.964475  0.983062 
 Sum sq. residuals  31.12421  179.4484  278.9180  33.10408  1082.473  882.7434 
 S.E. equation  1.094114  2.627139  3.275304  1.128377  6.452410  5.826806 
 F-statistic  372.9071  5.239321  32.83143  7.394681  145.7962  310.5398 
 Log likelihood -45.85936 -74.76574 -82.04274 -46.87693 -104.4182 -101.0527 
 Akaike AIC  3.203598  4.955500  5.396530  3.265269  6.752616  6.548647 
 Schwarz SC  3.521039  5.272941  5.713971  3.582710  7.070057  6.866088 
 Mean dependent  40.99879  8.117518  63.97838  6.152457  121.3252  70.18091 
 S.D. dependent  9.201787  3.519654  8.646054  1.673274  34.23384  44.77123 
 Determinant residual covariance (d.o.f. adj.)  43745.19         
 Determinant residual covariance  10463.74 
    
 Log likelihood -433.6684 
    
 Akaike information criterion  28.82839 
    
 Schwarz criterion  30.73303         
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Table A4.5. Structural VAR estimates 
Model: Ae = Bu where E[uu']=I       
Restriction Type: short-run text form 
  
@e1 = C(1)*@u1 
    
@e2 = C(2)*@e1 + C(3)*@u2 
   
@e3 = C(4)*@e1 + C(5)*@e2 + C(6)*@u3 
  
@e4 = C(7)*@e1 + C(8)*@e2 + C(9)*@e3 + C(10)*@u4 
 
@e5 = C(11)*@e1 + C(12)*@e2 + C(13)*@e3 + C(14)*@e4 + C(15)*@u5 
@e6 = C(16)*@e1 + C(17)*@e2 + C(18)*@e3 + C(19)*@e4 + C(20)*@e5 + C(21)*@u6 
where 
    
@e1 represents KOF residuals 
   
@e2 represents INF residuals 
   
@e3 represents PD residuals 
   
@e4 represents FD residuals 
   
@e5 represents REER residuals 
   
@e6 represents ER residuals 
   
  Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.     
C(2) -0.580125  0.405605 -1.430271  0.1526 
 
C(4)  0.738795  0.498194  1.482948  0.1381 
 
C(5) -0.28273  0.207481 -1.362682  0.1730 
 
C(7) -0.134006  0.162886 -0.8227  0.4107 
 
C(8)  0.004184  0.067506  0.061978  0.9506 
 
C(9)  0.189271  0.055108  3.434514  0.0006 
 
C(11)  1.136556  0.942127  1.206372  0.2277 
 
C(12)  0.316773  0.386531  0.819528  0.4125 
 
C(13) -1.014007  0.367620 -2.758303  0.0058 
 
C(14)  0.149785  0.996693  0.150281  0.8805 
 
C(16)  0.091603  0.814270  0.112497  0.9104 
 
C(17)  0.389208  0.330253  1.178516  0.2386 
 
C(18) -0.153706  0.344935 -0.445608  0.6559 
 
C(19)  2.836657  0.843330  3.363638  0.0008 
 
C(20) -0.218868  0.147242 -1.486458  0.1372 
 
C(1)  1.094114  0.134676  8.124038  0.0000 
 
C(3)  2.549311  0.313799  8.124038  0.0000 
 
C(6)  3.038486  0.374012  8.124038  0.0000 
 
C(10)  0.961906  0.118402  8.124038  0.0000 
 
C(15)  5.507458  0.677921  8.124038  0.0000 
 
C(21)  4.658421  0.573412  8.124038  0.0000 
 
Log likelihood  -457.2711         
Estimated A matrix: 
   
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.580125  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
-0.738795  0.282730  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.134006 -0.004184 -0.189271  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
-1.136556 -0.316773  1.014007 -0.149785  1.000000  0.000000 
-0.091603 -0.389208  0.153706 -2.836657  0.218868  1.000000 
Estimated B matrix: 
   
 1.094114  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  2.549311  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  3.038486  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.961906  0.000000  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  5.507458  0.000000 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  4.658421 
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Chapter 5 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
The thesis is an attempt to explore the importance of determinants of 
institutional quality on both macroeconomic stability and real economic 
growth in primarily IMF programme countries.  
 
The changing role of IMF– one from mainly maintaining the par-value 
system in member countries to provider of financial resources to ever 
increasing countries after the Third World debt crisis– not only enhanced 
the scope of its activities, but the conditionalities that were imposed had a 
telling bearing on the economic performance of recipient countries. 
Together with this, increased the amount of research that started to gauge 
the performance of these programmes in terms of putting in place an 
environment that supported sustained macroeconomic stability and real 
economic growth. Research literature, applying different counterfactual 
methodologies, pointed towards below par performance of the Fund on 
both these counts. Hence, overall macroeconomic stability could not be 
achieved in programme countries on sustained basis (Evrensel, 2002; 
Easterly, 2005), with no significant consequence of IMF programmes for 
either investment or inflation. Also, no positive consequence on economic 
growth in recipient countries could be found (Barro and Lee, 2005). At the 
same time, may countries (including Pakistan) became prolonged users of 
IMF resources. 
 
Similar consequences raised alarm among many researchers on the 
underlying neo-classical/monetarist behavioural assumptions of IMF 
programmes, who found them as too rigid, and not context-specific. The 
main problem was that IMF, as against the demand side of the economy, 
did not put adequate emphasis on the supply side. Even when it did 
internalize this criticism to some extent, the behavioural underpinnings of 
its programmes did not allow it to understand the due importance of 
institutions for macroeconomic stability and economic growth. 
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On the other hand, New Institutional Economics, saw economic agents 
which had bounded rationality, and were faced with transaction costs in a 
world of asymmetric information. Hence, they saw improvement in 
institutional quality as important for reducing costs faced by agents in the 
economy, and in turn overall had a positive impact on economic growth 
(Rodrik et al., 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999). A closer look indicated that 
institutions evolved such governance structures that resulted in reduced 
transaction costs (Groenewegen et al., 2010). According to NIE literature, 
both political- and economic institutions existed, where one influenced the 
other to bring overall change in institutional quality (Acemoglu, 2006; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The 
current study is therefore motivated by this 'missing link of institutions' in 
IMF programmes.  
 
The framework of NIE gives importance to both the political and economic 
determinants of institutional quality. In chapter 2, important determinants 
of institutional quality are researched in literature. Thereafter, that are 
tested for significance as important determinants of institutional quality. 
The scope of the study is primarily on the IMF programme countries, while 
a special analysis is also extended to see which determinants are 
particularly significant in the case of prolonged users. Among the various 
proxy variables for political- and economic institutional quality (PIQ and 
EIQ), respectively, the ones employed are Economic Freedom Index (EFI) 
of the Cato Institute
74
 for EIQ, and Polity II (from the Polity IV dataset of 
Marshall et al., 2011), which captures 'political structures and regime 
change'
75
 for PIQ. 
 
Selection of time period was important, and it was appropriate to select the 
starting point around the time of the Third World debt crisis, because it was 
then that the quantity and country coverage of IMF programmes 
substantially increased. Moreover, in order to make proper identification of 
prolonged users, it was important to have ten years of time periods. Hence, 
                                                          
 
74
 http://www.cato.org/economic-freedom-world 
75
 http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/9263?q=Polity 
IIandsearchSource=icpsr-landing 
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to achieve reliable results, 1980-2009 (30 years) was selected as 
appropriate time period.  
 
A number of institutional determinants were identified from literature as 
potentially important institutional determinants, that covered both the 
political/governance related sphere and also economic dimension. The 
variables on the political side included, type of regime indicating the 
presence of either presidential or parliamentary form of government, chief 
executive a military officer or not, the strength of government and 
opposition in parliament (indicated by Herfindahl Indices) respectively, 
quality of overall governance indicator, and extent of civil liberties. On the 
economic side extent of openness (indicated KOF Index of Globalization, 
taken as a proxy variable), measures of monetary-, fiscal-, and investment 
freedom, and real GDP were taken. 
 
A panel of 129 IMF programme countries were taken, and by applying the 
System GMM approach, results indicated that the dynamic process is 
highly persistent for both economic- and political institutional quality, 
highlighting the aspect of path dependent nature of evolution of 
institutional quality. Estimation results indicated that, a parliamentary form 
of government, level of aggregate governance, extent of civil liberties, level 
of openness, and property rights all have a positive impact on overall 
institutional quality. Separately both monetary- and investment freedom 
enhance political institutional quality; while economic growth holds 
positively impacts economic institutional quality. Moreover, military in 
reduces political institutional quality. Hence, it could be seen that 
institutional determinants matter in the way political and economy 
institutions evolve in IMF programme countries. Also, improved 
institutional determinants help provide an environment for better policy 
implementation, something important for execution of IMF programme and 
its successful completion.  
 
Chapter 3 started with identifying the criticism of IMF programmes in 
literature, which called for a rethinking of IMF programmes in terms of its 
behaviourial assumptions, and the rigid and one-size-fits-all kind of 
approach. With this context serving as a motivation, significant institutional 
determinants (from the previous chapter) are then tested- using a panel of 
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IMF programme countries (in terms of prolonged and non-prolonged 
users), and by applying once again the System GMM approach- on real 
economic growth, to see in turn their impact for time duration of 1980-
2009. Subsequently, the estimated impact of institutional determinants 
(both political and economic) was found to be overall significant for 
enhancing real economic growth, both for prolonged- and non-prolonged 
users of IMF.  
 
Along with looking at the direct impact of institutional determinants on real 
economic growth, their impact was also checked on macroeconomic 
instability. Moreover, here the indirect  impact of institutional determinants 
on real economic growth was also seen through the channel of 
macroeconomic stability. Results indicated that in fact such a relationship 
did exist, whereby institutional determinants positively impacted real GDP 
both directly, as well as indirectly, through the channel of macroeconomic 
stability. As an extension, similar results were obtained for non-programme 
countries, in terms of both the direct and indirect impact of institutional 
determinants on real economic growth. 
 
In chapter 4, prolonged users were focused on with the underlying 
motivation to explore the importance of institutional quality determinants 
for both macroeconomic stability and real economic growth. Pakistan was 
selected among the prolonged users as a representative case study, since 
after having been in many IMF programmes since the 1980s (been a 
prolonged user in both the decades of 1990s and 2000s), it had not been 
able to achieve either sustained macroeconomic stabilization or real 
economic growth. For meeting the technical requirement of VAR analysis 
technique, the time duration was expanded by taking a period of 1980-
2014, while the institutional quality determinant that was suited for 
analytical purpose (under this technique) was chosen to be KOF index of 
globalization.  
 
Here, time series data of Pakistan was backcasted with the underlying 
question to see the impact of enhanced institutional focus on 
macroeconomic instability and economic growth. For analysis VAR 
(Vector Autoregression) was constructed using all sub-indices of MII and 
indices of institutional quality – KOF index of globalization. Thereafter, 
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appropriate restrictions were imposed on contemporaneous relationship of 
variables to make VAR identified and for recovering structural shocks; 
which were then used to trace out the effect of KOF index of globalization 
on sub-indices of MII, and real economic growth, respectively. Thereafter, 
counterfactual simulations were conducted, assuming a hypothetical 
situation in which IMF programme has an institutional focus, whereby  a 
low, moderate, and a high scenario was taken in terms of 5, 10, and 
enhancement in in KOF index of  globalization. The thought process behind 
this was to see how gradual improvement in institutional quality impacted 
macroeconomic instability and real economic growth.  
 
Results indicated that intervention through institutional arrangement 
reduced macroeconomic instability and increase GDP growth rate. In all the 
three hypothetical scenarios average value of MII was less than that found 
in actual data; while this effect increased with increasing improvement in 
KOF index. It was pointed that through enhanced institutional focus by 
IMF programmes, Pakistan's economy could have grown more that its 
average economic growth of 5% during the last five decades.  
 
It is therefore being advised that IMF programmes put greater focus on 
institutional quality determinants so that it can perform better in terms of its 
objectives of achieving sustained macroeconomic stability and economic 
growth, both for the programme countries in general, and prolonged users 
in particular. 
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